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N the mid-1980s, the well-known postmodern artist Jeff Koons dis-
played a sculpture called "String of Puppies" in a New York gallery.1
The sculpture was based wholly on a photograph, taken by a man
named Art Rogers, of a couple with their arms full of puppies; Koons's
sculpture, intended as a commentary on how mass-produced art has
caused societal deterioration, caricatured the subjects of the photograph
by placing flowers in their hair and clown noses on the puppies they were
holding.2 Rogers, perhaps not surprisingly, brought suit against both
Koons and his gallery and won a grant of summary judgment, which the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.3 Per-
haps even less surprisingly, Rogers's successful claim was one for copy-
right infringement: Rogers alleged that Koons had created an
unauthorized derivative work, and the Second Circuit rejected Koons's
attempt to take advantage of copyright law's fair use provisions.4 But the
ease with which Rogers brought, and the Second Circuit analyzed, Rog-
ers's copyright infringement claim masks the fact that the interest Rogers
was seeking to protect was probably not a copyright interest at all. Rog-
ers was contending neither that Koons was interfering with Rogers's ex-
ploitation of his own photograph nor that he was appropriating a market
* © Laura A. Heymann 2006. Assistant Professor of Law, College of William &
Mary Marshall-Wythe School of Law. Many thanks to Tricia Bellia, Laura Bradford, Rob-
ert Brauneis, Michael Carroll, Susan Crawford, Graeme Dinwoodie, Stacey Dogan, Dave
Fagundes, Brett Frischmann, Eric Goldman, Ellen Goodman, Trotter Hardy, Cynthia Ho,
Tim Holbrook, Sonia Katyal, Bobbi Kwall, Greg Lastowka, Mark Lemley, Joe Liu, Mike
Madison, Paul Marcus, Mark McKenna, Tom Nachbar, David Post, Peter Shane, Kathy
Strandburg, Rebecca Tushnet, Polk Wagner, Katja Weckstrom, Phil Weiser, Fred Yen, and
Jonathan Zittrain for helpful comments and criticism, and to Tyler Akagi for research assis-
tance. This Article benefited greatly from presentations at faculty colloquia at the William
& Mary School of Law, Northeastern University School of Law, and the University of
Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law, as well as at the Southeastern Association of Law
Schools' New Scholar Workshop, the 2006 Works in Progress Intellectual Property Collo-
quium, the 2006 Philadelphia Colloquium, and the 2007 Chicago Intellectual Property
Colloquium.
1. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 305 (2d Cir. 1992).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 305-06.
4. Id. at 308-09. The Second Circuit concluded that despite Koons's claim that his
work was a commentary on, and not merely a copy of, Rogers's work, Koons had not
sufficiently communicated this message to the public. Id. at 310.
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open to Rogers without Rogers's authorization 5-indeed, the sculpture
had value in the marketplace only because Koons's name was attached to
it. 6 Rather, Rogers seemed more concerned with whether Koons's sculp-
ture altered viewers' association with Rogers's work or, more generously,
whether Koons's sculpture somehow conveyed to viewers that Rogers au-
thorized or sponsored Koons's work. 7 These interests, however deeply
felt, may be described as interests in the integrity of one's work, in
(mis)attribution, or in a right of publicity-but they are not copyright
interests. And yet the current state of copyright law permitted-perhaps
even encouraged-Rogers to couch his claim as a copyright law one.
Commentators, too, describe similar conflation as they consider the as-
sertion of copyright law claims in the second-generation creator world.
In 2005, Professor Larry Lessig presented a lecture at the Michigan State
University College of Law in which he described (and showed to his audi-
ence) various creative endeavors involving copyrighted works (what he
termed "remix culture") that presumably could not have been created
had the original content owner exercised the full extent of its rights under
U.S. copyright law. 8 Lessig described, for example, a video in which the
Lionel Richie/Diana Ross song "Endless Love" is played over video clips
of President George W. Bush and U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair.9
"Whatever you think of Tony Blair, whatever you think of the War,
whatever you think of President Bush," Lessig related, "the one thing you
cannot question about that clip is what the lawyers for the Lionel Richie
estate said when [copyright] permission was sought to synchronize
Richie's music with that set of images. The lawyer said, 'No we won't
give you permission because it is not funny."1 0 Whether the story is true
or apocryphal, two points seem relevant: U.S. copyright law would allow
Richie to assert such a claim to prohibit use of the work, and the claim is
not, at heart, a claim that aligns with copyright law's interests. As with
Rogers, Richie's claim is not that the video's creator has engaged in an
impermissible economic exploitation of the work that interferes with
5. See Andrew R. Bechtel & Arati R. Korwar, Copyright and the Creative Use of
Visual Artworks in the 1990s, 4 COMM. L. & POL'Y 431, 460 (1999) ("[lIt seems unlikely
that the value of the works of the visual artists who sued Jeffrey Koons would suffer as a
result of his uses.").
6. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 304.
7. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this was Rogers's true interest in bringing suit.
See, e.g., John M. Leighty (UPI), Feb. 9, 1990 (quoting Rogers as saying, "I kept looking at
the photograph and his sculpture and it was outrageous how he exploited my work and
called it his art. It was my idea, my concept and my visual image."); Liz Lufkin, Art
World's Tradition of Subtle Plagiarism, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 18, 1990, at B4 (quoting Donald
Prutzman, Rogers's attorney, as saying, "'I was shocked by the similarity and the fact that
he'd done it without any acknowledgment to Art or business relationship with him.' ").
8. Lawrence Lessig, Creative Economies, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 33, 39 (2006) (pro-
viding a transcription of the Second Annual Distinguished Lecture in Intellectual Property
and Communications Law).
9. Id. at 37.
10. Id. at 39. Lessig continued: "So, we set up a system requiring permission, yet per-
mission is not coming. And so people are faced with the choice to obey the law or not to
obey the law, to create or not to create." Id.
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Richie's actual or potential market for the work. Rather, Richie's claim
(at least, as articulated by Lessig) is that the work is being used to convey
a particular (political) message, one with which Richie does not wish to
be associated. A deeply felt interest, perhaps, but probably not one
based in copyright law.
We can find many other stories like these: examples of first-generation
creators using the blunt tool of copyright law to restrict use of their works
by second-generation creators, even where the interests sought to be pro-
tected inhere in integrity, reputation, or false association rather than ex-
ploitation, market substitution, or incentive destruction." And, not
surprisingly, cases like these arouse great concern on the part of copy-
right minimalists, who quite rightly fear that overuse of copyright law to
restrict use and dissemination of copyrighted works thwarts the creativity
of second-generation creators.1 2 But, properly recounted, these stories
are not about creators who are seeking to control the use of the work qua
work: the number of copies that are distributed or the exploitation of the
work in derivative form (such as in a movie or a translation). In other
11. See, e.g., Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1242 (D.
Colo. 2006) (copyright infringement claim brought against distributors of edited copies of
plaintiffs' films); Jackson v. Warner Bros., 993 F. Supp. 585, 592 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (African
American artist protesting use of his artwork in Warner Bros. film). See generally Bechtel
& Korwar, supra note 5, at 440-58 (citing examples); Laura R. Bradford, Parody and Per-
ception: Using Cognitive Research to Expand Fair Use in Copyright, 46 B.C. L. REV. 705,
744-45 (2005) (citing examples). The Church of Scientology is a notorious, and much exco-
riated, user of copyright law to restrict dissemination of church documents by critics. See,
e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1365-66
(N.D. Cal. 1995); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.N.E.T., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1468, 1469 (D.
Colo. 1995); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1364-65 (E.D. Va. 1995). As
to Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997), in
particular (involving a satire of the O.J. Simpson trial written in the style of the children's
book author), Judge Kozinski and Christopher Newman write:
The presumption that an injunction is available to stop copyright infringe-
ment is particularly troubling in this case, because the only real harm was the
prospect of the author's work being associated with something unsavory. Af-
ter all, it's not likely that a lot of parents would decide to pass up Green Eggs
and Ham and bring Dr. Juice home to their kids instead.
Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What's So Fair About Fair Use?, 46 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y U.S.A. 513, 518 (1999); see also id. at 519 (suggesting, without further comment, that
trademark law might be the better vehicle for Seuss Enterprises' claims). Even J.K. Rowl-
ing, author of the Harry Potter series, who reportedly tolerates significant use of her work
in fan fiction efforts, apparently uses copyright law to restrain work that "purports to be
written by Rowling herself" or is pornographic. Tracy Mayor, Taking Liberties with Harry
Potter, BOSTON GLOBE, June 29, 2003, at 14.
One might contend that the concerns of such creators sound more in the belief that
second-generation creators are altering the copyright owner's intended message in the
work and thus that recharacterization of this claim should mirror dilution, not infringe-
ment. See, e.g., Bradford, supra, at 746-52. But there are strains of these concerns even in
a straightforward infringement action, in which the rationale underlying the claim is not
only that the trademark owners will be deprived of a sale but also that consumers will hold
the trademark owner's brand in lesser regard as a result of mistakenly choosing the in-
fringer's product. My skepticism of dilution law more generally, see Laura A. Heymann,
Metabranding and Intermediation: A Response to Prof Fleischer, 12 HARV. NEG. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2007), renders further consideration of this point in this Article
impracticable.
12. Kozinski & Newman, supra note 11, at 525.
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words, these creators are not truly seeking to trade on the incentives
given to them by copyright law and the economic rights that come from
the limited monopoly copyright law grants.1 3 Rather, the motivating fac-
tor for these artists appears to be something quite distinct: perhaps a con-
cern that the public will mistakenly conclude that the artists have
authorized the use of their work in the manner at issue or perhaps a con-
cern that the political or other message being conveyed by the second-
generation creator will disrupt consumer associations with the original
artist. If this is the case, then what is motivating these plaintiffs aren't
truly copyright concerns at all-if anything, they are trademark-type con-
cerns (although whether they are strong or legally cognizable trademark-
type concerns is another matter). Trademark law is, after all, concerned
not with controlling the distribution of goods qua goods; it is concerned
with the way in which the source (or sponsorship) of those goods is
presented to the public.1 4 But because U.S. copyright law currently ac-
commodates these interests indirectly (by allowing a copyright owner to
bring suit to enjoin most unauthorized uses of a work), neither courts nor
creators are forced to recognize this distinction.
We might care, however, about correctly sorting these interests into
their respective categories for one reason beyond mere doctrinal integ-
rity: By allowing copyright to reach beyond its core purpose-to offer
incentives for creation that resolve the free-rider/nonrivalrous goods
problem-courts grant first-generation creators the very power to thwart
second-generation creators that Lessig and others fear. Were courts to be
more vigilant about policing the line between copyright claims and non-
copyright claims-in other words, forcing content owners to assert under
copyright law only those claims that are concerned with the use of the
work qua work-we might see a world in which the broad injunctive re-
lief available to prevailing copyright owners appears less frequently, re-
placed by narrower forms of injunctive relief tailored to the reputational
harms content owners are asserting, such as disclaimers or credit lines.
But content owners not only currently have no motivation to abandon
their copyright claims in these situations, they also currently cannot easily
assert their reputational or attributional interests under any other regime.
Although a cornerstone of the European moral rights regime, a right to
attribution (or, relatedly, a right to a disclaimer of nonattribution) has
never had more than a toehold in U.S. intellectual property law.1 5 And
whatever such rights federal courts had been willing to find in the Lan-
ham Act have now largely been eviscerated following the United States
Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp.,16 in which the Court rejected the plaintiff's attempt to use the
13. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 2006).
14. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995).
15. See Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 353,
354 (2006). But see 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A (providing visual artists with limited moral
rights).
16. 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
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Lanham Act to require attribution for a film in the public domain (and
thus free from copyright). Part of the Court's resistance in Dastar arose
from its conclusion that the bargain inherent in U.S. copyright law re-
quires unfettered access to the work once the copyright term ends in ex-
change for the benefits afforded the creator during the term. 17 Any
requirement of attribution or disclaimer would impose a restriction on
the public domain that copyright law cannot tolerate; accordingly, trade-
mark law-based claims must give way.18 But this view mischaracterizes
both the nature of the copyright bargain and the scope of trademark law.
Properly construed, the copyright bargain cedes to the public only the
rights given to the creator during the copyright term: the exclusive right
to control copies, distribution, display, performance, and derivative
works. 19 Enforcement of other interests based on other legal regimes
shouldn't necessarily interfere with the public's ability to exploit any of
the rights it receives as part of the copyright bargain.
In this Article, I want to explore the notion that one solution to the
threat copyright law poses to "remix culture" is not to reform copyright
law-at least not in the ways that are typically proposed, such as ex-
panding notions of fair use or reinstating copyright formalities.20 Instead,
we might ask courts to pay more attention to the types of claims content
owners are asserting as copyright claims and force claims that are really
about non-copyright law concerns into a separate regime. (As I will dis-
cuss, I propose the doctrine of copyright misuse as the mechanism by
which to accomplish this reallocation of claims.21) The "separate regime"
resides, I think, in trademark law's realm,22 although it is not necessarily
coextensive with trademark law properly construed; accordingly, it de-
pends to some extent on both the willingness to recognize the possibility
17. Id. at 33-34.
18. Id. at 33-36.
19. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106.
20. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 8, at 39-42.
21. Greg Lastowka has identified much the same issue but proposes an amendment to
copyright law's fair use provisions as the solution. See Greg Lastowka, Digital Attribution:
Copyright and the Right to Credit, 48-50, available at http://works.bepress.com/lastowka/2
(proposing that the fair use factors of 17 U.S.C. § 107 be amended to include consideration
of whether the alleged infringer has provided attribution to the author of the work). Fred
Yen proposes greater judicial attention to First Amendment concerns regarding what he
terms "aggressive copyright claims." Alfred C. Yen, Eldred, The First Amendment, and
Aggressive Copyright Claims, 40 Hous. L. REV. 673, 688-92 (2003). Laura Bradford has
noted the presence of branding-type issues in many copyright law claims but proposes
greater attention to cognitive research within the existing fair use framework. See Brad-
ford, supra note 11, at 709. Relatedly, Mark Lemley has suggested that the fair use doc-
trine "should separate the idea that the copyright owner should be compensated for a use
from the idea that the copyright owner should be able to control that use." Mark Lemley,
Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing? 3, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cmf?abstractid=917161 (proposing alternative remedy scheme).
22. Throughout this Article, the term "trademark" should be read as a shorthand en-
compassing the variety of interests addressed under the Lanham Act, including unfair com-
petition and false advertising interests. This shorthand is not meant to negate the fact that
attributional and associational interests are distinct interests and so may require different
analyses even within the general framework proposed in this Article.
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of an attributional-type right in trademark's domain for the relatively
small category of claims for which a harm can be articulated and the re-
sponsibility of ensuring that this recognition does not unduly expand
trademark law.23 Not every perceived harm that sounds in reputational
or attributional interests is, in fact, a viable legal claim-indeed, very few
such claims may survive once they are reconceptualized, and this is the
point. In other words, we should not simply recast conceptually problem-
atic copyright claims as doctrinally problematic trademark claims. 24
Under such a construct, it seems that assertion of this trademark/copy-
right divide should not be limited to works under copyright but should
also continue into the post-copyright realm of the public domain. Once
we conclude that the attributional or associational interests content own-
ers are attempting to vindicate are not properly asserted as copyright
claims, there is no coherent reason to let notions of the public domain
disturb this distinction.
This renewed attention to some form of a limited attribution-type
right-whether accomplished judicially or legislatively-might well have
a salutary effect on U.S. intellectual property law more generally by ben-
efiting both sides of the copyright maximization debate. First, it provides
content owners with a more legitimate, and more robust, method of as-
serting the associational claims that motivate the kinds of actions I de-
scribe here, rather than effecting a doctrinal misfit by shoehorning those
claims into the copyright format.25 And second, it eliminates the need
(and therefore, the ability) of content owners to use copyright law to
achieve these associational goals, thus eliminating the ability to restrict
dissemination of the work outright in favor of (one hopes) a more limited
remedy of disclosure and/or disclaimer.26
Despite the benefits that might accrue to the public if there existed a
greater recognition of the different goals of copyright and trademark, in-
tellectual property scholars have tended to be skeptical of overlapping
protection schemes or a legal analysis that would appear to work an ex-
23. Indeed, it might be the case that the copyright owner bringing the original copy-
right claim (e.g., a publisher) is asserting attributional interests that are not in fact its own
and so may well (and quite correctly) have no trademark-type claim to bring at all. Thanks
to Dave Fagundes for encouraging me to clarify this point.
24. Thanks to Fred Yen for helping to refine this point. As others have noted, atten-
tion must also be paid to assertions of trademark infringement built on slender reeds. See,
e.g., BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 57, 96 n.49 (1967).
25. Again, this is not to say that even when asserted under trademark law principles,
such claims will, or should, always succeed; it is only to say that if they are asserted at all,
they should be asserted under the correct legal doctrine.
26. Bradford, supra note 11, at 740 ("By adding a copyright claim to what are essen-
tially trademark concerns, owners are able to sidestep trademark's broader free speech
safeguards."). Indeed, because content owners of the type I describe are essentially seek-
ing to control the message of source conveyed with the communicative good, rather than
the good itself, the use of copyright law to obtain an injunction against further dissemina-
tion of the work tends to look like an impermissible prior restraint. See, e.g., Mark A.
Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property
Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998); Kozinski & Newman, supra note 11, at 516.
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pansion of the limited term of copyright.2 7 And given the ways in which
copyright holders often attempt to use copyright law to restrict the speech
of others that is critical of the copyright holder's work,2 8 this skepticism is
understandable and warranted. Intellectual property law of any stripe
should not be used to, as Wendy Gordon has described it, "impermissibly
inhibit others from turning the original works to their own aesthetic, cul-
tural and political advantage. '29 But the current state of copyright law
seems to foster this result more than it does discourage it.
The goal of this Article is not to argue for trademark or intellectual
property expansionism as such; as noted, any recognition given to a more
robust attributional right in trademark's realm must be cabined by at
least the limitations that would apply to other trademark law-based
claims. Nor am I challenging the belief that a rich public domain spurs
creativity or in any way suggesting that more raw materials should be
propertized. To the contrary, I am seeking a way to preserve the core of
the public domain-the ability to use the materials in question in the pro-
duction of other works-in light of an ever-expanding copyright law. In
short, I am suggesting that the solution to overreaching copyright law al-
27. See, e.g., Lee B. Burgunder, Trademark and Copyright: How Intimate Should the
Close Association Become?, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 89, 92 (1989) ("[N]either the copy-
right nor the trademark system should allow the creator of a useful or ornamental idea to
earn monopoly profits since protection under these systems is easier to obtain and has a
longer life."); Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of
Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1476 (2004)
(contending that "the availability of overlapping intellectual property protection in all of
its forms presents a serious threat to the goals and purposes of federal intellectual property
policy"). But see KAPLAN, supra note 24, at 50 (noting, in admittedly something of an
aside, that a later author that gave his characters the same name as those in Twelfth Night
might be engaged in "passing off"); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A
Technological Approach to Trademark Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 611, 627 (1999) ("As a gen-
eral rule ... cumulative legal causes of action to sustain different interests or to secure
different relief are not regarded as inherently objectionable."); Doris Estelle Long, First,
"Let's Kill All the Intellectual Property Lawyers!": Musings on the Decline and Fall of the
Intellectual Property Empire, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 851, 891 (2001) ("[Hostility to intel-
lectual property rights] ignores the different nature of each form of intellectual property:
each form was created to protect a particular aspect of intellectual productivity."). Addi-
tionally, A. Samuel Oddi writes:
The expiration of one of the federal titles of protection cannot drag another
extant title into the public domain. If a general rule is suggested, it would be
that the public may exploit any creation in the public domain provided there
is no extant form of protection that would otherwise preclude this
exploitation.
A. Samuel Oddi, The Tragicomedy of the Public Domain in Intellectual Property Law, 25
HASTINGS COMM. & Er. L.J. 1, 48 (2002); see also Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegel-
man, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1502-03
(2002) (contending that the "Supreme Court's hostility to leveraged patents [through
trademark law] is ill-conceived" because "[any diminution in the scope of trademark pro-
tection available to patentees increases the relative value of their patent monopoly, and
correspondingly, forces them to rely on monopolistic rents to recover their investment in
R&D").
28. See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir.
2001).
29. Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism
in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1536 (1993).
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ready exists; it simply exists outside of copyright law itself.30
Part II sets the stage for my proposal by illustrating the fundamental
differences between copyright law and trademark law-in their incen-
tives, their goals, and their range of remedies. It then goes on to trace the
jurisprudence at the other intellectual property interfaces, in which courts
have recognized distinctions they seem unwilling to recognize at the
trademark/copyright interface. Part III considers issues relating to (and
possible objections to) my proposal posed by conceptions of the public
domain and proposes a different reading of the public domain that is
more consonant with the nature of the copyright term that precedes it.
Part IV sets forth the proposal: a recognition of the attribution interest in
communicative goods during both the term of copyright and in the public
domain, coupled with greater scrutiny of trademark-based claims mas-
querading as copyright-based ones. In essence, I suggest that courts
should pay more attention when content owners attempt to use an over-
broad notion of copyright law to assert trademark-based claims and re-
strict assertion of copyright claims to those instances in which such
owners are seeking to vindicate copyright interests. Thus, where the con-
tent owner is not seeking to prevent competitive use of the work but is
really seeking attribution or disassociation, courts should allow them to
do so, but only through something akin to trademark law (and, indeed,
should view the use of copyright law in such circumstances as a form of
copyright misuse). Next, I contend that because this construct should ap-
ply even when the copyright term ends for a work, courts should pay
more attention when defendant content users attempt to use an over-
broad notion of the public domain to blunt these trademark-type claims.
Copyright law and trademark law are different regimes, with different
motivations and different remedies, and there should be no reason why a
properly stated trademark law-based claim should have to fall by the
wayside simply because no valid copyright claim exists.
II. THE TRADEMARK/COPYRIGHT INTERFACE
Before considering how copyright law and trademark law came to be
seen as duplicative schemes, it might be helpful to reinforce the separate
economic foundations underlying each. From there, we can consider how
similar distinctions have been recognized at other intellectual property
law interfaces and why the line is considerably blurrier at the trademark/
copyright interface.
30. David Lange, who is supportive of a robust public domain, once argued along
similar lines. See David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CoNTEMP.
PROBS. 147, 177 (1981) ("[T]here can be little damage to the public domain in requiring
precautions designed to prevent genuine deception or confusion .... ). In this regard, my
proposal is more modest than it might appear at first glance. My goal is merely to propose
an additional (and existing) tool that might usefully deal with the concerns raised by an
expansive copyright law and to suggest that the prevailing view of the copyright/trademark
intersection has obscured this tool's availability.
[Vol. 60
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A. THE GOALS OF COPYRIGHT LAW AND TRADEMARK LAW
Although both are today typically explained in terms of economics,
U.S. copyright law and trademark law are motivated by different con-
cerns and, therefore, are directed toward different goals.3 1 Copyright's
economic story is one of incentives.32 In this (the most dominant) telling,
the rights provided by copyright law are necessary in order to induce the
appropriate amount of creative products; without these incentives, cre-
ators would presumably underproduce. 33 In this regard, copyright law is
aligned with patent law: both embody a set of rights used to induce cre-
ators and inventors to share their work with the public by granting a lim-
ited period of time during which the creator or inventor can exact
monopoly prices. 34
The set of rights copyright law offers creators all relate to exploitation
of the work. 35 Assuming the work clears the constitutional hurdles of
originality and fixation, the copyright owner enjoys for the statutory pe-
riod the exclusive right to control the reproduction, distribution, public
performance, and display of the work, in addition to control over whether
any derivative works are created. 36 Each of these rights relates to the use
of the work itself and, in particular, the exploitation of the work in its
various forms. 37 Essentially, the nature of the incentive tells creators,
31. Compare Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 207 n.15 (2003) (citing artists' testi-
mony before Congress to the effect that "the copyright system's assurance of fair compen-
sation for themselves and their heirs was an incentive to create"), with Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003) (stating that the Lanham Act "broadly prohibits
uses of trademarks ... that are likely to cause confusion about the source of a product or
service"), superseded by Trademark Dilution Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat.
1730.
32. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1610-12
(1982). But see, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic
Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1946 (2006) (challenging
this view as neglecting "inspirational or spiritual motivations for creativity"). Other justifi-
cations-a Lockean theory of deserts or a sense of moral rights-have been proffered but
have not won overwhelming favor in U.S. jurisprudence or scholarship. See, e.g., John
Shepard Wiley, Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 139 (1991).
33. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 207 n.15.
34. See, e.g., Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine
of Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 865, 876 n.32 (2000) ("Both [patent and copyright law] represent a legislatively
determined trade-off between increased ex ante incentives for investment and reduced ex
post utilization through an exclusive property right, where in a rough sense, it is accepted
that the social benefits of increased supply exceed the social costs of short term inefficient
use.").
35. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 2006). I am excluding from this discussion the rights pro-
vided by 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Fair Use Rescued, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1449, 1452 (1997)
("Copyright is a commercial doctrine; the reasonable commercial expectations of the origi-
nal author needed to be protected from one who would quote in order to compete by
offering a substitute for the original."). It may be useful to note that the Statute of Anne
(U.S. copyright law's ancestor) granted exclusive rights only in the "printing and re-
printing" of a book, with infringement being the act of "print[ing], reprint[ing], or im-
port[ing]" without consent. KAPLAN, supra note 24, at 7. Other commentators have
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much as it does in the patent scheme, "The world will be a better place
for your creations. If you bring them forth, we will give you, for a limited
time period, the exclusive right to profit from them." Infringement, too,
is explained largely in terms of these market-based rights: infringement,
put simply, is use of the copyrighted work during the copyright term in
violation of one of these rights.38 In other words, infringement is an at-
tempt by the infringer to appropriate for himself the economic due that is
the author's, 39 rendering the infringer potentially subject to payment of
damages and/or an injunction. 40
Copyright law does, of course, provide a significant exception to this
general principle in the form of a "fair use" provision, in which parties
who are engaging in transformative (as opposed to substitutive) use of
the work, such as commentary or criticism, are deemed not to have com-
mitted infringement even though such use has not been authorized by the
copyright holder.41 Here, too, the analysis is driven largely by whether
the defendant's use is a substitute in the marketplace for the plaintiff's
work.42 The focus on this question makes sense given the economic na-
ture of the rights granted to the copyright holder: If the rights are largely
about the exclusive ability of the copyright holder to monetize the work
at issue, a concurrent, unauthorized use of the work by another party
during the copyright term can be permissible only if it doesn't compete
with the copyright owner's work in the market.43
Thus, despite the pervasive trope of the Romantic author throughout
copyright law commentary-a view that has never quite accurately de-
scribed authorship vis-A-vis copyright law in any eventaa-it would seem
to be the dominant view that market-based interests (rather than moral
asserted noneconomic justifications for copyright. See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Pre-
serving Personal and Reputational Interests of Constructed Personas Through Moral Rights:
A Blueprint for the Twenty-First Century, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 151, 170 (2001).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a).
39. Id.; see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433
(1984) (describing an infringer as "anyone who trespasses into [the copyright owner's] ex-
clusive domain by using or authorizing the use of the copyrighted work in one of the...
ways set forth in the statute"); Yen, supra note 21, at 674 ("Copyright exists to provide
economic incentives for the production of creative works, and copyright plaintiffs generally
sue to keep the defendant from appropriating or destroying revenue streams the plaintiff
would otherwise enjoy from the sale or other exploitation of the plaintiff's work.") (foot-
note omitted).
40. 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-505.
41. Id. § 107.
42. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590-93 (1994); Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985); Gordon, supra note 32,
at 1639-40.
43. See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 312 (2d Cir. 1992) ("It is plain that where
a use has no demonstrable impact on a copyright owner['s] potential market, the use need
not be prohibited to protect the artist's incentive to pursue his inventive skills."); KAPLAN,
supra note 24, at 53 (suggesting that "cross-lifting among serious musical works" should be
permitted under copyright law because of, inter alia, "the unlikelihood that borrowing di-
verts profit from the original composer").
44. See, e.g., Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of the Authornym: Authorship, Pseudo-




or personality interests) are what are at the heart of U.S. copyright law.
Copyright law, in other words, appeals to creators' interest in monetizing
their cultural production by offering them certain exclusive rights to do so
for a limited time.45
Although it also can be explained in economic terms, trademark law,
by contrast, has historically not been justified in terms of promoting crea-
tivity.46 Unlike copyright and patent law, trademark law is not designed
to offer the trademark holder incentives to create; indeed, the prevailing
view (but probably not among marketers) is that virtually no creativity at
all is required to develop a trademark. 47 Rather, trademark law is typi-
cally justified in terms of the public interest-protecting consumers from
deception in the marketplace by prohibiting the use of source-identifying
marks if such use is likely to confuse consumers as to the source of the
product. In economic parlance, the protection of trademarks both "re-
duce[s] the customer's costs of shopping and making purchasing deci-
sions" by allowing the consumer to easily find (or avoid) the product he
used last time and "helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating
competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated
with a desirable product. '48 An entity that uses another's valid trade-
mark in a way that evidences a likelihood of confusion among the rele-
vant consumer market is deemed to have infringed that trademark.49
Although trademark infringement cases typically involve what the av-
erage member of the public would think of as a trademark (a word, a
logo, or a slogan), the unfair competition provisions of the Lanham Act
45. In Eldred, in which the Court held valid the Copyright Term Extension Act of
1998, the Court quoted with approval the statement in American Geophysical Union v.
Texaco Inc., that "copyright law celebrates the profit motive, recognizing that the incentive
to profit from the exploitation of copyrights will redound to the public benefit by resulting
in the proliferation of knowledge." Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003) (quot-
ing Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), affd, 60
F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994)). Of course, there is much creation subject to copyright that is not
motivated by the possibility of profit-some scholarly writing, many of the user-created
videos on sites like YouTube, and no doubt a large number of existing blogs. Indeed, for
these creators the sole interest they may have in their creation is the non-copyright interest
in attribution for their efforts.
46. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
47. See, e.g., id. ("The ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to invention or
discovery.... The trade-mark does not depend upon novelty, invention, discovery, or any
work of the brain. It requires no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought. It
is simply founded on priority of appropriation."); Dinwoodie, supra note 27, at 630. Not all
scholars agree with this assessment. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 27,
at 1472 ("[T]he insistence [by the Supreme Court] on viewing copyright, patent, and trade-
marks as protecting distinct social goals-a position shared by many Law and Economics
scholars-is in many cases simply wrong. As we will show, trademark protection also spurs
innovation and can complement the incentive provided by patents to expend resources on
R&D.").
48. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995) (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted); see also, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and
Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2105-07 (2004).
49. U.S. trademark also provides a cause of action for dilution of a famous mark, see
15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West 2006), but I have focused on that cause of action elsewhere.




are not so limited nor are they limited to protection of things registered
as trademarks with the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act permits a cause of action against any per-
son who, "in connection with any goods or services," uses any "word,
term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or
misleading representation of fact" that is likely to cause confusion as to
the "affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another
person" or as to the "origin, sponsorship, or approval" of his goods or
services. 50 Because this is considerably broad language, courts have rec-
ognized trademark-like interests in elements such as the distinctive sound
of a singer's voice and a famous author's name.51 In such cases, the plain-
tiff's claim is not that the defendant is using the plaintiff's mark to con-
fuse consumers into thinking that the defendant's products are made by
the plaintiff (as would, say, the maker of "Popsi Cola") but rather that the
defendant is using some distinctive (and source-identifying) aspect of the
plaintiff himself in order to deceptively suggest to consumers that the
plaintiff has some connection with the defendant or the defendant's prod-
ucts (that is, a sponsorship or authorization). 52
Thus (and this is something of an oversimplification), while copyright
law gives the right holder the ability to control distribution of the work
itself, trademark law, properly enforced, gives the right holder the ability
to control the manner in which that work is presented to the public and,
specifically, the ability to attempt to control the association consumers
make when they encounter the mark.53 Because the two regimes are mo-
tivated by different concerns and are aimed at different goals, there
should be no doctrinal reason why a plaintiff couldn't enforce both claims
concurrently or separately, as appropriate. 54 Yet many scholars appear to
be resistant to this concept for reasons that don't seem to arise in consid-
50. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
51. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1992) (singer's
voice); King v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824, 828-29 (2d Cir. 1992) (author's name).
52. Indeed, until the Court's 2003 decision in Dastar, courts were willing to consider a
cause of action under section 43(a) for failure to attribute source in connection with com-
municative goods although many, if not most, of these cases involved misattribution rather
than simply a complete lack of attribution. See, e.g., Waldman Publ'g Corp. v. Landoll,
Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 780-81 (2d Cir. 1994); Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 603-07 (9th Cir.
1981).
53. Compare 17 U.S.C.A. § 106, with 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c).
54. The Supreme Court has often noted that copyright law and trademark law serve
distinct goals. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 n.19
(1984) (noting that the Court has "consistently rejected the proposition that a similar kin-
ship exists between copyright law and trademark law" as exists between copyright law and
patent law); United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (noting
that the rights available under trademark law bear "little or no analogy" to those available
under copyright or patent law); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 91-92 (1879); McLean v.
Fleming, 96 U.S 245, 254 (1877); Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 322 (1872); see
also, e.g., EFS Mkt'g, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 76 F.3d 487, 493 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[Tlhe
Copyright Act and the Lanham Act address different harms. The first follows from a lack




eration of other areas of the law in which there are overlapping rights.55
A tract of real property, for example, can be protected both by the law of
trespass and by the law of nuisance, and no one would suggest that the
landowner must choose one legal scheme to the exclusion of the other.
In intellectual property, by contrast, an "information wants to be free"
trope is more pervasive, such that any restrictions on the use of creative
material beyond those provided by copyright are seen as "additional" and
therefore improper.
This discomfort seems to be limited to, or at least focused on, commu-
nicative goods-in other words, at the trademark/copyright interface as
opposed to other intersections in intellectual property law. At both the
patent/trademark interface and at the patent/copyright interface, by con-
trast, the courts seem more solicitous of the coexistence of both intellec-
tual property schemes, based on the same kind of distinction among goals
and remedies that I have just discussed here.
B. THE PATENT/TRADEMARK INTERFACE
The Dastar Court's conclusion that it is trademark law, and not copy-
right law, that must give way when the two are in apparent conflict was
based on a series of patent cases that, as the Court described them, evince
the Court's efforts to be "careful to caution against misuse or over-exten-
sion of trademark and related protections into areas traditionally occu-
pied by patent or copyright. ' 56 But a review of these opinions (which fall
entirely into the patent realm) shows that, almost uniformly, the Court
was careful to leave some room for trademark law-related interests in
fields largely occupied by patent-specifically, it imposed on the entity
practicing the now patent-free invention an obligation to provide
whatever disclaimers or disclosures were necessary to eliminate consumer
confusion.
In Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June Manufacturing Co., the Court held
that a company that had copied the plaintiff's sewing machine after the
patent on it had expired had the right not only to copy the machine but
55. See supra note 27. But see, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"?: Copyright and
Other Protection of Works of Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 338, 371 (1992) ("[T]he federal trademarks law affords protection not against copying
per se, but against falsehoods in the marketplace. As a result, the protection afforded
under the Lanham Act is not substantively equivalent to copyright or patent protection.");
Marci A. Hamilton, A Response to Professor Benkler, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 605, 623
(2000) (suggesting that Congress could enact database legislation under the Commerce
Clause so long as the legislation did not "create copyright rights in information"). Yochai
Benkler, who is a strong proponent of an expansive public domain, has also recognized this
distinction, although he characterizes it as a concern subordinate to copyright law rather
than a co-equal regulatory scheme. See Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice
and the Constitutional Foundation of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173,
178 (2003) ("While Congress may regulate information markets under the Commerce
Clause, it may not do so by creating exclusive private rights in information in a way that
circumvents the substantive limitations placed on its power by [Article I, Section 8, Clause
8 of the Constitution].").
56. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003).
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also to call the machine a "Singer," given that the word had, over time,
become the generic term for that type of sewing machine. 57 (To the ex-
tent that the Court determined that "Singer" was a generic term and not
a trademark, its conclusion that makers of similar machines could call
their products by that name is uncontroversial.) 58 Nevertheless, it was
still incumbent upon the defendant and others in similar situations, the
Court held, to avoid creating any consumer confusion in the marketplace
that might result from its lawful exercise of its public domain rights under
the expired patent:
It is self evident that on the expiration of a patent the monopoly
created by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly
covered by the patent becomes public property.... It equally follows
from the cessation of the monopoly and the falling of the patented
device into the domain of things public, that along with the public
ownership of the device there must also necessarily pass to the public
the generic designation for the thing which has arisen during the mo-
nopoly .... But it does not follow, as a consequence of a dedication,
that the general power, vested in the public, to make the machine
and use the name imports that there is no duty imposed, on the one
using it, to adopt such precautions as will protect the property of
others and prevent injury to the public interest, if by doing so no
substantial restriction is imposed on the right of freedom of use. This
principle is elementary and applies to every form of right, and is gen-
erally expressed by the aphorism sic utere tuo ut alienum non loedas.
This qualification results from the same principle upon which the
dedication rests, that is, a regard for the interest of the public and the
rights of individuals. 59
Thus, the Singer Court recognized that patent law and trademark law re-
spond to two distinct interests: the interest in monopoly over production
and use (and similarly, in copyright, the interest in monopoly over crea-
tion and distribution) and the interest in preserving source attribution or,
at the very least, minimizing consumer confusion. And, as the Court
noted, the public interest is concerned with both: with the use that results
once the limited monopoly of patent or copyright expires and with a mar-
ketplace free of confusion as to source.
Similarly, in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., the Court held that
after the patent on shredded wheat expired, the former patent holder
could not prevent the defendant from making the product and from call-
ing it by the now generic name "shredded wheat," but the plaintiff could
exercise its right to stop the defendant from confusing consumers as to
the source of its product (or, more particularly, to require the defendant
to specifically identify its own product). 6°
57. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
58. Id. at 180-81.
59. Id. at 185-86.
60. Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 119-21 (1938). Indeed, the Court
noted that the defendant was under such an obligation no fewer than four separate times in
its opinion. See also id. at 121 (describing the defendant's obligation as being to "use every
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Other cases follow a similar theme. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
Co.61 and its companion case, Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc.,62 the Court rejected the plaintiffs' attempts to use state unfair com-
petition law to prevent the defendants in each case from copying the
plaintiffs' formerly patented designs and selling those designs in the mar-
ketplace. 63 As the Court noted in Sears, the federal patent scheme in-
volves a tradeoff between the limited monopoly over production and use
given to the patent owner and the ability to practice once the patent ex-
pires: "[W]hen the patent expires the monopoly created by it expires, too,
and the right to make the article-including the right to make it in pre-
cisely the shape it carried when patented-passes to the public. ' 64 Ac-
cordingly, the Court concluded, a state could not create additional patent
rights that would be invoked post-expiration without coming into conflict
with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.65 But the Court's lan-
guage was targeted only at alternative statutory schemes (in this case,
state unfair competition law) that created a shadow patent scheme.66 The
Court took pains to note that state unfair competition law could be in-
voked to enforce trademark- or unfair competition-based rights, so long
as the requirements of that law were met:
Doubtless a State may, in appropriate circumstances, require that
goods, whether patented or unpatented, be labeled or that other pre-
cautionary steps be taken to prevent customers from being misled as
to the source, just as it may protect businesses in the use of their
trademark, labels, or distinctive dress in the packaging of goods so as
to prevent others, by imitating such markings, from misleading pur-
chasers as to the source of the goods. But because of the federal
patent laws a State may not, when the article is unpatented and un-
copyrighted, prohibit the copying of the article itself or award dam-
ages for such copying.67
The Court made much the same point in Compco:
reasonable means to prevent confusion"). Graeme Dinwoodie has quite correctly charac-
terized this admonition from the Court as "an assessment of the manner in which the de-
fendant was exercising its right to copy ... to determine congruence with principles of
unfair competition." Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Story of Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit
Co.: Breakfast with Brandeis, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 220, 233 (Jane C. Gins-
burg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006).
61. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
62. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
63. In Sears, the item was a pole lamp, Sears, 376 U.S. at 225-26; in Compco, the item
was a lighting fixture, Compco, 376 U.S. at 234.
64. Sears, 376 U.S. at 230 (citing Kellogg and Singer).
65. Id. at 231.
Obviously a State could not, consistently with the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution, extend the life of a patent beyond its expiration date or give a
patent on an article which lacked the level of invention required for federal
patents. To do either would run counter to the policy of Congress of granting
patents only to true inventions, and then only for a limited time.
Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 232-33 (footnote omitted).
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[W]hile the federal patent laws prevent a State from prohibiting the
copying and selling of unpatented articles, they do not stand in the
way of state law, statutory or decisional, which requires those who
make and sell copies to take precautions to identify their products as
their own. A State of course has power to impose liability upon
those who, knowing that the public is relying upon an original manu-
facturer's reputation for quality and integrity, deceive the public by
palming off their copies as the original. 68
In other words, state unfair competition law may be invoked, even as to
an article for which the patent has expired, to protect trademark-based
rights involving source identification and labeling so long as the law is not
used to create an extension of patent-law based rights (that is, the right to
prevent use or sale of the item full-stop). 69 Thus, a putative plaintiff
under these circumstances could not simply point to the existence of the
defendant's identical article as proof of unfair competition; it would have
to demonstrate that a likelihood of confusion as to source existed sepa-
rate and apart from the mere (and lawful) act of copying.70
Any question as to the correct reading of these cases was answered by
the Court in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.:
Read at their highest level of generality, [Sears and Compco] could
be taken to stand for the proposition that the States are completely
disabled from offering any form of protection to articles or processes
which fall within the broad scope of patentable subject matter....
That the extrapolation of such a broad pre-emptive principle from
Sears is inappropriate is clear from the balance struck in Sears it-
self .... [O]ur decision in Sears clearly indicates that the States may
place limited regulations on the circumstances in which such designs
are used in order to prevent consumer confusion as to source. Thus,
while Sears speaks in absolutist terms, its conclusion that the States
68. Compco, 376 U.S. at 238; see also Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Copying in the Shadow
of the Constitution: The Rational Limits of Trade Dress Protection, 80 MINN. L. REV. 595,
611 (1996) ("By linking its holding directly to the Intellectual Property Clause, Compco
recognized a constitutional foundation for the right to copy product configurations, with
liability possible only if a defendant's labeling failed to eliminate the risk of confusion
caused by its copying of distinctive nonfunctional elements of the plaintiff's design."). For
a discussion about the parallels between consideration of federal intellectual property
schemes and federal/state preclusion analysis, see Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in
Copyright Law, 41 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 137, 167-68 (1993).
69. Compco, 376 U.S. at 238 ("[R]egardless of the copier's motives, neither these facts
[as to secondary meaning] nor any others can furnish a basis for imposing liability for or
prohibiting the actual acts of copying and selling."); cf. id. at 239 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(stating that where the defendant copied with the dominant purpose of palming off, the
plaintiff's remedy should include "reasonable restrictions" on the copying itself); see also
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989) ("Where the
public has paid the congressionally mandated price for disclosure, the States may not
render the exchange fruitless by offering patent-like protection to the subject matter of the
expired patent.") (emphasis added).
70. In Bonito Boats, the Court characterized the appellate court's decision affirming
the district court's injunction as "coming to the conclusion that the Illinois law of unfair
competition prohibited product simulation even in the absence of evidence that the defen-




may place some conditions on the use of trade dress indicates an
implicit recognition that all state regulation of potentially patentable
but unpatented subject matter is not ipso facto pre-empted by the
federal patent laws.71
Thus, the Florida statute at issue in Bonito Boats, which prohibited the
commercial use of a direct molding process to duplicate a manufactured
vessel hull without authorization, was impermissible because, although it
could be described as an "unfair competition" statute, its effect was not to
protect consumers from deception by, for example, requiring accurate la-
beling or disclosures, but rather was to restrict the use of the article it-
self.72 The Florida statute did not contain any requirement that the vessel
hull functioned as a source indicator or possessed secondary meaning, nor
was the statute concerned with preventing consumer deception. 73 In-
stead, it allowed the manufacturer to assert patent-like rights over the
design even though that design had already been disclosed to the public
and thus rendered unpatentable under federal law.74
Taken together, the Court's decisions at the patent/trademark interface
indicate where the line is drawn: Neither federal nor state trademark or
unfair competition law may provide patent-like rights for articles that
cannot be patented under federal patent law-in other words, rights that
grant the inventor the ability to prohibit use or sale of the article itself-
but they may certainly provide trademark-like rights for those same un-
patentable articles-rights that do not restrict use per se but do place
some limitations on the way that use is presented to the public. 75 So long
as the purportedly competing statutory scheme promotes goals that are
different from those promoted by the federal patent system, both
schemes can peacefully co-exist. 76 As the Court noted in Bonito Boats:
71. Id. at 154; see also id. at 165 ("States may place limited regulations on the use of
unpatented designs in order to prevent consumer confusion as to source.").
72. Id. at 157-58.
73. Id. at 158 ("In contrast to the operation of unfair competition law, the Florida
statute is aimed directly at preventing the exploitation of the design and utilitarian concep-
tions embodied in the product itself."). Respectfully, I find this reading of the Court's
holding in Bonito Boats to be less controversial than do other commentators. See, e.g.,
Ginsburg, supra note 55, at 364-65.
74. Id.
75. The Court has engaged in a similar discussion regarding preemption of state intel-
lectual property schemes by federal law. Cf. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S.
470, 493 (1974) ("[State t]rade secret law and [federal] patent law have co-existed in this
country for over one hundred years. Each has its particular role to play, and the operation
of one does not take away from the need for the other."); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.
546 (1973); see also Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 494 (Marshall, J., concurring):
[T]he question presented in this case is whether Congress, in enacting the
patent laws, intended merely to offer inventors a limited monopoly in ex-
change for disclosure of their invention or instead to exert pressure on inven-
tors to enter into this exchange by withdrawing any alternative possibility of
legal protection for their inventions. I am persuaded that the former is the
case.
Id.
76. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 166 (noting that in Sears and Kewanee, "state protec-
tion was not aimed exclusively at the promotion of invention itself, and the state restric-
tions on the use of unpatented ideas were limited to those necessary to promote goals
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"[T]he law of unfair competition . . . [has] coexisted harmoniously with
federal patent protection for almost 200 years, and Congress has given no
indication that [its] operation is inconsistent with the operation of the
federal patent laws." 77
These general statements as to the interaction between patent law and
trademark law have been given practical effect by the lower courts. In In
re Mogen David Wine Corp., to take just one example, the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals (the predecessor to the Federal Circuit) held
that the manufacturer of a distinctive wine bottle could assert trademark
rights in the bottle even though it also held a design patent in the bottle.78
In holding that the manufacturer was not required to assert rights only
under one scheme or the other, the court rejected the argument that the
potentially perpetual nature of trademark rights might improperly extend
the patent monopoly:
In our opinion, trademark rights, or rights under the law of unfair
competition, which happen to continue beyond the expiration of a
design patent, do not "extend" the patent monopoly. They exist in-
dependently of it, under different law and for different reasons. The
termination of either has no legal effect on the continuance of the
other. When the patent monopoly ends, it ends. The trademark
rights do not extend it.... Patent expiration is nothing more than the
cessation of the patentee's right to exclude held under the patent
law. Conversely, trademark conceivably could end through non use
during the life of a patent. We doubt it would be argued that the
patent rights should also expire so as not to "extend" them. 79
Similarly, in Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., the Seventh Circuit rejected the
argument that to allow trademark protection for product configurations
would contravene the limitations inherent in the Patent Clause:
Compared to patent protection, trademark protection is relatively
weak because it precludes competitors only from using marks that
are likely to confuse or deceive the public ... [W]hile a patent cre-
ates a type of monopoly pricing power by giving the patentee the
exclusive right to make and sell the innovation, a trademark gives
the owner only the right to preclude others from using the mark
when such use is likely to cause confusion or to deceive ...
[P]erpetual trademark protection under the Lanham Act for a prod-
uct configuration or design is not the equivalent of impermissible
perpetual patent protection. 80
outside the contemplation of the federal patent scheme"); see also, e.g., Graeme W. Austin,
The Berne Convention as a Canon of Construction: Moral Rights After Dastar, 61 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 111, 125-26 (2005).
77. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 166.
78. In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 930-32 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
79. Id. at 930.
80. Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 637-44 (7th Cir. 1993). The Supreme
Court's subsequent decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000),
which held that product designs could not be protected as trademarks without a showing of
secondary meaning, does not render the conclusion of the Kohler court incorrect; Samara
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Thus, building on the Court's guidance in the cases just outlined, the
lower courts have more explicitly concluded that the enforcement of
rights based in trademark law is independent of the enforcement of rights
under patent law, 81 just as the enforcement of, say, emission standards as
to a particular automobile is independent of efforts to enforce the com-
mon law of theft as to that same vehicle.
As in copyright, patent law involves a certain quid pro quo: the disclo-
sure of the invention to the public in exchange for a limited monopoly
during the term of the grant. 82 One important bulwark at the trademark/
patent interface that derives from this exchange is the functionality doc-
trine. Under this doctrine, a defendant is free to copy functional features
of an item no longer under patent even if those features became source
identifiers during the term of the patent.83 To take one well-known judi-
cial example, once the patent on a spring mechanism for road signs ex-
pired, competitors could freely copy that design even if the exclusive use
enjoyed by the patentee during the term resulted in the development of
secondary meaning.84 The theory behind the doctrine is that features
that are functional in nature may be copied freely post-patent term be-
cause it is precisely those features that were the subject of the patent in
the first place. 85 The bargain inherent in patent law requires this result; if
competitors could not use the very elements of the item that make the
item work, then they essentially cannot use the item at all, rendering the
public domain on the other side of the patent term ephemeral. 86 But
even here, the courts have been careful to note that a competitor cannot
use any nonfunctional elements that indicate the source of the original
creator if to do so would sow consumer confusion; 87 moreover, even the
use of the functional aspects of the invention may, in limited instances, be
required to be accompanied with a disclaimer or other method of dispel-
Bros. merely requires evidence of trademark status for product designs, rather than assum-
ing it.
81. See, e.g., Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche Automobilie E Corse v. Roberts, 944
F.2d 1235, 1241 (6th Cir. 1991) ("[T]rademark protection does not unduly extend the sev-
enteen-year monopoly guaranteed by the patent laws because the two sources of protec-
tion are totally separate .... Thus, Lanham Act protection is available to designs which
also might have been covered by design patents as long as the designs have acquired secon-
dary meaning."); W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.)
("The trademark owner has an indefinite term of protection, it is true, but in an infringe-
ment suit must also prove secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion, which the owner
of a design patent need not do; there is therefore no necessary inconsistency between the
two modes of protection."); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1215
(8th Cir. 1976) ("The protection accorded by the law of trademark and unfair competition
is greater than that accorded by the law of patents because each is directed at a different
purpose. The latter protects inventive activity which, after a term of years, is dedicated to
the public domain. The former protects commercial activity which, in our society, is essen-
tially private .... Free competition is served in both cases.").
82. 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(2), (d) (West 2006).
83. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001).
84. Id. at 29-30.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929).
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ling any false intimation of association or sponsorship.8 8 Thus, the func-
tionality doctrine does its own work at policing the trademark/patent
divide: It does not prohibit the second user from making use of the very
thing guaranteed to him under the patent laws but rather places restric-
tions only on the way that use is presented to the public.
C. THE COPYRIGHT/PATENT INTERFACE
Much the same analysis is seen at the copyright/patent interface, de-
spite the fact that copyright and patent, as two regimes designed to en-
courage creative production in exchange for eventual ceding to the public
domain, might be seen as closer to overlapping. Nevertheless, as the Su-
preme Court noted in Mazer v. Stein, "Neither the Copyright Statute nor
any other says that because a thing is patentable it may not be copy-
righted. ' '89 Although Congress's power to enact both schemes derives
from the same clause of the Constitution,90 and both are justified by the
public interest in creativity or invention, patent and copyright address dif-
ferent aspects of the creative process: Patent protects the invention of a
new idea, while copyright specifically does not protect the underlying
idea but protects only a particular expression of that idea.91 Or, as the
Mazer Court put it, "The dichotomy of protection for the aesthetic is not
beauty and utility but art for the copyright and the invention of original
and ornamental design for design patents."92
As at the trademark/patent interface, copyright law has a functionality
doctrine that works to render unto copyright what is copyright's and unto
patent what is patent's. Pursuant to this doctrine, any design that is "dic-
tated solely by a utilitarian function of the article that embodies it" 9a-
that is, a design that is more idea than expression-may not receive copy-
right protection (although it may, if it qualifies, be protected by patent).
But the ornamental or design elements of an object that exist indepen-
dently of the functional aspects of the item may receive copyright protec-
tion,94 just as the source-identifying elements of a functional article that
88. See Thomas F. Cotter & Angela M. Mirabole, Written on the Body: Intellectual
Property Rights in Tattoos, Makeup, and Other Body Art, 10 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 97,
125-31 (2003); Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of the Mer-
chandising of Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. REv. 603, 614 n.69 (1984).
89. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954).
90. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inven-
tors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
91. Compare 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2006), with 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (West 2006).
92. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218; see also, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105 (1880):
The description of [a bookkeeping method] in a book, though entitled to the
benefit of copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to the art it-
self. The object of the one is explanation; the object of the other is use. The
former may be secured by copyright. The latter can only be secured, if it can
be secured at all, by letters-patent.
Id.
93. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 1302(4) (excluding from copyright protection a design "dictated
solely by a utilitarian function of the article that embodies it").
94. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 101:
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exist separately from the functional aspects may qualify for protection
under the Lanham Act. Thus, in Mazer v. Stein, the Court held that the
creator of a small china statuette of male and female dancing figures
could maintain its copyright in the work even after the statuette had been
used as the base for a table lamp.95 The two schemes, the Court con-
cluded, served different goals, such that the availability of protection
under one could not preclude protection under the other:
We find nothing in the copyright statute to support the argument
that the intended use or use in industry of an article eligible for copy-
right bars or invalidates its registration. We do not read such a limi-
tation into the copyright law. Nor do we think the subsequent
registration of a work of art published as an element in a manufac-
tured article is a misuse of the copyright. This is not different from
the registration of a statuette and its later embodiment in an indus-
trial article.96
The question of whether a creator could avail himself of both copyright
protection and patent protection simultaneously did not directly arise in
Mazer; because the creator had not in fact obtained a design patent, the
issue in that case was whether the functional nature of the statuettes
barred protection as a work of art under copyright. 97 But the question
did arise directly before the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals twenty years later. In In re Yardley, the court relied on Mazer's
foundational point to hold that the creator of a watch face design could
indeed avail himself of the protections of both doctrines;98 any require-
ment that the creator elect one or the other, the court held, would be "in
direct conflict with the clear intent of Congress" to provide both design
patent protection and copyright protection, given that nothing in either
statutory scheme requires a creator to choose.99 In particular, the Yar-
dley court rejected the Commissioner of Patents' argument (citing Sears)
that to allow a creator to enjoy the protection of both copyright law and
patent law for the same article would subvert Congress's goals in the pat-
ent scheme because when the patent expired, the invention would still be
subject to the longer term of copyright, although no longer subject to the
restrictions of patent law:
The design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be iden-
tified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utili-
tarian aspects of the article.
95. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217.
96. Id. at 218-19; see also Chosun Int'l Inc. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 413 F.3d 324,
328 (2d Cir. 2005).
97. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 204-05.
98. In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
99. Id. at 1395 ("To paraphrase the Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein: Neither the
copyright statute nor the patent statute says that because a thing is copyrighted it may not
be patented as a design. We should not so hold.").
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We agree that the copyright secured by appellant's assignee will out-
live any design patent appellant may secure .... But the mere fact
that the copyright will persist beyond the term of any design patent
which may be granted does not provide a sound basis for rejecting
appellant's design patent application .... If anything, the concurrent
availability of both modes of securing exclusive rights aids in achiev-
ing the stated purpose of the constitutional provision.100
Given this seemingly uncontroversial line of cases at both the patent/
trademark interface and the patent/copyright interface holding that there
is no fatal conflict between the two regimes in each pair, properly circum-
scribed, one might wonder whether a different result should necessarily
obtain when the inquiry is at the trademark/copyright interface. The an-
swer, curiously, now seems to be yes.
D. THE TRADEMARK/COPYRIGHT INTERFACE
This was not always the case, however. For example, in Frederick
Warne & Co. v. Book Sales Inc., the court rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that because the books at issue (several children's books by Beatrix
Potter, including The Tale of Peter Rabbit) had fallen into the public do-
main, the defendant was free not only to republish the stories themselves
but also to use the same cover illustrations as had been used for the plain-
tiff's series:
The fact that a copyrightable character or design has fallen into the
public domain should not preclude protection under the trademark
laws so long as it is shown to have acquired independent trademark
significance, identifying in some way the source or sponsorship of the
goods. Because the nature of the property right conferred by copy-
right is significantly different from that of trademark, trademark pro-
tection should be able to co-exist, and possibly to overlap, with
copyright protection without posing preemption difficulties. 10 1
The same was true in Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v.
General Signal Corp., in which the plaintiff publisher of Consumer Re-
ports brought suit against the manufacturer of a vacuum cleaner that was
favorably reviewed in the magazine; the manufacturer had included quo-
100. Id. at 1395-96 (rejecting the argument that permitting copyright protection to con-
tinue after the patent term ends effects a "failure of consideration"; "[a] patent is not a
contract"). To be clear, my argument here is an attempt to engage in a reading of the
existing statutory scheme, not to propose alternatives to it. Whether it was wise for Con-
gress to permit certain creators to avail themselves of both patent and copyright law, de-
spite the differing terms, is a discussion I leave to others. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen & Mark
A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 27
(2001) (noting the potential conflict between patent law and copyright law in the context of
reverse engineering of software).
101. Frederick Warne & Co. v. Books Sales, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1196 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (citation omitted). See also Long, supra note 27, at 878 ("The right to such dual
protection [in Frederick Warne] was premised on a clear acknowledgement that each arena
of intellectual property law served its own special goals, and on the incongruity of limiting
protection to works that were more creative.").
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tations from the review in the manufacturer's television advertising. 02
The complaint alleged causes of action both under copyright law and
under the Lanham Act.10 3 The Second Circuit held that the defendant's
use of material from the review constituted fair use'° but that this find-
ing did not preclude consideration of the plaintiff's Lanham Act claim,
which was assessed on its own merits. 0 5 The court did not suggest, for
example, that because the material used in the advertisement fell into the
realm of material free from the restrictions of copyright law (in this case,
because of the fair use finding), the Lanham Act could not apply because
any restrictions from trademark law would impermissibly encroach on the
rights guaranteed to the defendant as part of the copyright bargain. In-
deed, the court noted that the trademark-based claims were really what
were at stake, stating, "CU is not really objecting to Regina's copying
CU's expression. The statement of policy in its magazine and its position
in its brief before us is that any mention of CU in commercial advertising
will diminish its effectiveness as an unbiased evaluator of products. ' 10 6
Although it ultimately concluded that there was no likelihood of confu-
sion sufficient to support a preliminary injunction, the court further rec-
ognized the difference between copyright law and trademark law when it
noted, in dicta, that had such a finding been made, the proper remedy
would have been a disclaimer, not an injunction. 10 7 This is entirely con-
sistent with a reasoned view of the separate spheres that copyright law
and trademark law occupy: Copyright law controls distribution of the ma-
terial qua material; trademark law controls how the source of that mate-
rial is presented to the public.10 8
This is not to say, however, that this view of the copyright/trademark
interface has been universal. In Comedy III Products, Inc. v. New Line
Cinema, for example, the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's attempt to
102. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1046-47 (2d
Cir. 1983).
103. Id. at 1047.
104. The court concluded that the material copied, although used for commercial pur-
poses, was factual and informational, that the amount of material copied was "relatively
insubstantial," and that the defendant's use did not compete in the market with the plain-
tiffs use. Id. at 1049-50.
105. Id. at 1051.
106. Id. at 1050 & n.7 ("Truthful extcerpting of CU's ratings cannot hurt CU unless the
public perceives that CU sponsored the use. In such a case § 43(a) of the Lanham Act and
the privacy statutes which prevent unauthorized product endorsements are more
appropriate.").
107. Id. at 1053 ("The First Amendment demands use of a disclaimer where there is a
reasonable possibility that it will suffice to alleviate consumer confusion.").
108. See, e.g., Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1148-49 (2d
Cir. 1987) (rejecting a copyright claim as to a bicycle rack for failure to meet conceptual
separability requirement but remanding for additional findings on the trademark law
claim, noting that functionality in trademark doctrine differs); Indep. Baking Powder Co. v.
Boorman, 130 F. 726, 728 (3d Cir. 1904) ("The complainant in this case is not seeking [by
filing a trademark infringement case] to prevent the manufacture of baking powder by the
defendant, but only to prevent him from using a mark or brand that would tend to induce




use the Lanham Act to restrain use of a clip from a Three Stooges movie
that had fallen into the public domain; the clip played on a television in
the background of a scene in the film The Long Kiss Goodnight.10 9
While purporting to deny the plaintiff's claim on the ground that it had
failed to show that the film clip functioned as the plaintiff's trademark, 110
the court made a much broader statement about the viability of Lanham
Act claims post-expiration of copyright:
[T]he footage at issue here was clearly covered by the Copyright Act,
and the Lanham Act cannot be used to circumvent copyright law. If
material covered by copyright law has passed into the public domain,
it cannot then be protected by the Lanham Act without rendering
the Copyright Act a nullity."'
Although the Supreme Court had previously considered the issues at
the patent/trademark and patent/copyright interfaces, it had not paid
much attention to whether the same considerations held true at the trade-
mark/copyright interface. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp. presented that opportunity." 2 Twentieth-Century Fox, the holder
of the exclusive television rights for Dwight D. Eisenhower's book about
the Allied campaign in Europe during World War II, failed to retain
rights in the television series eventually produced when it did not renew
the copyright, leaving the television series in the public domain.'1 3 Das-
tar, a producer of music CDs looking to capitalize on the fiftieth anniver-
sary of the end of World War II, acquired tapes of the series, edited them,
and released the series as its own product, without any reference to the
109. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. New Line Cinema, 200 F.3d 593, 594 (9th Cir. 2000).
110. Id. at 595. Indeed, the court later noted that the plaintiff might well have main-
tained a viable claim if the defendant had "used the likeness of The Three Stooges on t-
shirts which it was selling." Id. at 596.
111. Id. at 595. In my view, the court reached the correct result but for the incorrect
reason. Comedy III should not have lost its suit because copyright law and trademark law
are irreconcilable, and not even necessarily because the clip could not serve a trademark
function; it should have lost because, as the court initially indicated, the use of the film clip
for thirty seconds in the background of another film did not indicate sponsorship or au-
thorization (i.e., there was no likelihood of confusion). Cf. Clemens v. Belford, Clark &
Co., 14 F. 728 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1883) (holding that a publisher was free to publish the works
of Mark Twain that were in the public domain in any form it chose, including by (accu-
rately) stating the name of the author on the compilation); see also Kohler Co. v. Moen
Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 639 n.9 (7th Cir. 1993):
The [Clemens] court did not rule out trademark protection to the author's
use of his pen name. Rather, the court simply held that because Twain had
not obtained a copyright in his works, his writings had been dedicated to the
public and anyone could publish them if they properly identified the writings
as Twain's. Twain's trademark infringement claim was a loser because he did
not (and could not) allege that the defendants had falsely identified the ori-
gin of the published works. There was minimal risk that the public would be
confused as to the source because the defendants clearly identified Mark
Twain as the author; Twain simply resented that the publisher would profit
due to his failure to obtain copyright protection.
112. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
113. Id. at 26.
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original series' producers.1 14 Dastar's offering competed with a reissue of
the original Fox series (for which Fox had reacquired television rights in
the book), and so Fox and its affiliates brought suit, alleging that the Das-
tar series infringed both the copyright in the book and Fox's rights under
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.1 15
The Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Scalia,116 held that the
Ninth Circuit erred by affirming the district court's award of summary
judgment on the Lanham Act claim in favor of Fox.117  Section
43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act, the provision under which Fox had as-
serted its claims, creates a cause of action against one who uses in com-
merce "any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof," or "any false designation of origin," or a "false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact" that is
likely to cause confusion as to "the affiliation, connection, or association
of such person with another person" or as to "the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another
person." 118 Fox's allegation that Dastar had made a false representation
as to the "origin" of the goods, the Court held, was unfounded: "Goods"
in section 43(a)(1)(A) referred not to the intellectual property contained
on the videotapes Dastar distributed but to the physical videotapes them-
selves, and Dastar was indisputably the source of the physical product.' 19
The case therefore turned, in the Court's view, on a simple statutory anal-
ysis: the Lanham Act prohibits misleading statements in connection with
the sale of "goods"; "goods" in this context refers to physical, not intel-
lectual, items; and Dastar made no false representation with respect to
114. "Dastar's Campaigns series [was] slightly more than half as long as the original
Crusade television series. Dastar substituted a new opening sequence, credit page, and
final closing for those of the Crusade television series; inserted new chapter-title sequences
and narrated chapter introductions; moved the 'recap' in the Crusade television series to
the beginning and retitled it as a 'preview'; and removed references to and images of the
book." Id. at 26-27.
115. Fox's Lanham Act claim was brought as a "reverse passing off" claim, asserting a
violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(a). Id. at 27 & n.1. Fox alleged, in essence, that Dastar
violated the Lanham Act by misrepresenting that Dastar, rather than Fox, was the source
of the television series.
116. Justice Breyer, whose brother heard the case by designation at the appellate court
level, did not participate in the case.
117. Id. at 38.
118. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (West 2006). Section 1125(a)(1)(B) prohibits the
same activities in "commercial advertising or promotion" if they "misrepresent[ ] the na-
ture, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods,
services, or commercial activities." Id. § 1125(a)(1)(B).
119. As the Court described:
We think the most natural understanding of the "origin" of "goods"-the
source of wares--is the producer of the tangible product sold in the market-
place, in this case the physical Campaigns videotape sold by Dastar .... [A]s
used in the Lanham Act, the phrase "origin of goods" is in our view incapa-
ble of connoting the person or entity that originated the ideas or communica-
tions that "goods" embody or contain. Such an extension would not only
stretch the text, but it would be out of accord with the history and purpose of
the Lanham Act and inconsistent with precedent.
Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31-32.
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the source of origin of the physical item.120
But the Dastar Court went beyond this textual analysis to address more
fundamental issues at the copyright/trademark interface. The possibility,
the Court noted, that a trademark-based interest might even exist as to
the intellectual property (as opposed to the physical vehicle) was
unlikely:
The consumer who buys a branded product does not automatically
assume that the brand-name company is the same entity that came
up with the idea for the product, or designed the product-and typi-
cally does not care whether it is. The words of the Lanham Act
should not be stretched to cover matters that are typically of no con-
sequence to purchasers. 121
This was also the view of some commentators before the time of the Das-
tar opinion. Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman, for example,
suggested in 2002 that, for two reasons, there would be little need for a
copyright owner to assert trademark rights in the same material because
consumer interests would not be served thereby.122 First, they contended
that consumers of communicative products aren't much concerned with
source.' 23 Once material falls into the public domain, they argued, con-
sumers will refuse to pay more for authentic goods. Second, they as-
serted that consumers of copyrighted works are not repeat customers and
so don't have the need for consistent use of trademarks that consumers of
tangible goods do.' 24
Both of these contentions, it seems to me, are misaligned with how
consumers experience communicative goods. A film buff is almost cer-
tainly willing to pay more for a video of a film titled M if he can be sure
that he is getting Fritz Lang's 1931 classic and not the panned 1951 re-
make, and the reader who enjoys John Grisham novels and who wants to
read more of them will almost certainly look for the "John Grisham"
brand the next time she is at the bookstore.12 5 (Indeed, Parchomovsky
and Siegelman ultimately concede that because "most copyrighted goods
are experience goods, the purchasing decisions of consumers will, to some
extent, be influenced by past consumption of other products of the same
120. One commentator has suggested that the Court's reading of the statute can be
interpreted fairly narrowly given that it focused only on the word "origin" and not on the
statute's additional references to "sponsorship" or "approval." Rick Mortensen, D.I.Y.
After Dastar: Protecting Creators' Moral Rights Through Creative Lawyering, Individual
Contracts and Collectively Bargained Agreements, 8 VAND. J. Er. & TECH. L. 335, 342
(2006).
121. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 32-33.
122. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 27, at 1499-1500.
123. Id. at 1499.
124. Id.
125. Heymann, supra note 44, at 1416-17.
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brand. ' 12 6) Similarly, buyers of Fox's and Dastar's products127 are very
likely motivated not by the quality of the physical product when making
purchasing decisions but by the quality of the creative product contained
on the videotapes; it is for this reason that Fox's claim, properly inter-
preted, concerned Dastar's statement as to the source of origin for the
intellectual property, whatever Fox's real motivation for bringing suit. As
I have mentioned elsewhere, 128 consumers of the New York Times or the
New York Post do not view those titles as indicating a source or origin for
the newsprint-the physical good on which the newspaper is printed-
but rather use those titles as indications of the source of the intellectual
property contained in those newspapers.
The Dastar Court acknowledged that communicative products might
function differently in this way, but ultimately concluded that revising its
conclusion as to the scope of the statutory meaning of the word "goods"
in the Lanham Act (or, as the Court put it, according "special treatment"
to communicative products 129) would create a conflict with copyright law:
"The right to copy, and to copy without attribution, once a copyright has
expired, like 'the right to make [an article whose patent has expired]-
including the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried when pat-
ented-passes to the public."1 30 Thus, the Court concluded, where the
goals of trademark law (preventing confusion as to source among con-
sumers) conflict with the goals of copyright law (granting the freedom to
copy once material enters the public domain), trademark law must give
way.
Although it never says so directly, the Court's conclusion in this regard
seems to proceed from a belief that, as between the two, copyright law
enjoys a natural preeminence over trademark law. But why this is the
case is not entirely clear. The Court does note that copyright law and
trademark law have different goals and are motivated by different con-
cerns.' 3 ' Copyright law, as I noted earlier, is designed to induce creators
to create; trademark law, by contrast, is designed to "'reduce[ ] the cus-
tomer's costs of shopping and making purchasing decision[s]" and to
"help[ ] assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will
reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable
product." 1 32 But this difference in motivations does not alone suggest
126. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 27, at 1500 ("For example, Blue Note, the
famous jazz label, may rationally reduce the price of copyrighted recordings to entice jazz
lovers to purchase the label's other recordings.").
127. 1 use here the designation of the parties, fully aware that neither Fox nor Dastar,
as corporate entity, was the actual creators of the material at issue.
128. Heymann, supra note 44, at 1440-41.
129. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003).
130. Id. (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,230 (1964)) (empha-
sis added). The emphasized phrase appears to be the Court's addition in Dastar, it does
not appear in the cases the Court cites for this principle. See supra text accompanying
notes 57-74.
131. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33.




that when the two are in conflict, copyright should prevail. Having ap-
parently reached this conclusion, however, the Court's remaining justifi-
cations follow naturally. First, because, like patent law, copyright law
embodies a "carefully crafted bargain" in which, once the monopoly
granted the copyright holder expires, the public may use the work "at will
and without attribution, 1 33 limiting this right in any way through trade-
mark law would be inappropriate. This can be true, however, only if one
assumes that copyright law's interests and trademark law's interests can-
not both be accommodated. Second, the Court noted, Congress created a
limited attribution right in the form of the Visual Artists Rights of Act of
1990, which provides that the author of an artistic work shall, in very
limited circumstances, "have the right . . . to claim authorship of that
work. '134 Having created only this limited attributional right in the copy-
right law scheme, the Court concluded, Congress could not have intended
the Lanham Act to provide additional attributional rights. 135 But this ar-
gument seems to ignore the historical point that the United States, upon
acceding to the Berne Convention in 1988, asserted that it need not enact
new legislation to comply with the Convention's requirement that mem-
bers provide authors with attribution rights.136 The U.S. took the posi-
tion that existing federal laws, including the Lanham Act, already
afforded authors such protections. 137
Next, the Court turned to difficulties in implementation, noting, first,
that even if "origin" under section 43(a) were applied with respect to
communicative products, it would be difficult to determine to whom that
definition should apply 138 and, second, that even if this hurdle could be
133. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Again, it is unclear from where the Court
derives its conclusion that the public domain encompasses not only the right to use the
work but to do so without attribution. See Austin, supra note 76, at 126 ("[T]he premise
that the public domain is good for the public does not lead inexorably to the conclusion
that the public is also well served by misleading information about authorship being affixed
to public domain material.").
134. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a)(1)(A) (West 2006). The attributional right is limited to
"works of visual art," which must exist only in a single copy or in a "limited edition of 200
copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author." See id.; see
also id. § 101.
135. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34-35:
When Congress has wished to create such an addition to the law of copyright,
it has done so with much more specificity than the Lanham Act's ambiguous
use of "origin." ... Recognizing in §43(a) a cause of action for misrepresen-
tation of authorship of noncopyrighted works (visual or otherwise) would
render [VARA's] limitations superfluous.
Id.
136. Austin, supra note 76, at 112-17.
137. Id.
138. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 35-36.
A video of the MGM film Carmen Jones, after its copyright has expired,
would presumably require attribution not just to MGM, but to Oscar Ham-
merstein II (who wrote the musical on which the film was based), to Georges
Bizet (who wrote the opera on which the musical was based), and to Prosper
Merimde (who wrote the novel on which the opera was based).... We do not




overcome, plaintiffs like Fox would resist application of the very remedy
they ostensibly sought because, in the Court's view, they would not want
any modifications of the work to be attributed to them and, indeed, might
view such attribution as an equally false representation of authorization
or sponsorship. These practical difficulties, while not insignificant, do not
seem on their own to justify the Court's decision. Experience with situa-
tions such as orphan works139 demonstrates that many areas of intellec-
tual property law face hurdles in implementation relating to source
identity issues, and there is no reason why the Lanham Act should stand
alone in that regard.
Ultimately, the consideration that seemed to most motivate the Court
in Dastar is the idea that recognizing the application of trademark-type
rights in areas where copyright may be the dominant form of protection
leads to a "mutant" form of copyright law that impermissibly "limits the
public's federal right to copy and to use expired copyrights" 140 by en-
croaching upon the public domain. But, just as at the other intellectual
property law interfaces, there seems to be nothing that particularly distin-
guishes the public domain in copyright law such that trademark law has
no place there.
III. TRADEMARK AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
A. THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
The usual argument for why trademark law cannot have a place at the
table post-copyright is because permitting such intrusion would restrict
copyright's public domain. In this vision, the public domain is seen as
something of a sacred and wholly inviolate realm, a source of raw mate-
rial for future creators that can be taken without restriction and without
regard to any other legal regime. This view of the public domain is an
attractive one and has much to commend it. Surely the world is a better
place for West Side Story and the many other variations of Romeo and
Id.
Strangely, the Court seemed to think that this effort would be much easier when the
work is copyrighted (as opposed to formerly copyrighted): "Without a copyrighted work as
the basepoint, the word 'origin' has no discernable limits." Id. at 35. The Court did not
indicate why the task of identifying the source of a work becomes more difficult the mo-
ment a work falls out of copyright.
139. The Copyright Office's report on its approach to orphan works (works still under
copyright but for which the copyright holder cannot be located easily or at all) is available
at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf. Of particular note is that the
Copyright Office has proposed that, so long as an accused infringer engaged in a "good-
faith, reasonably diligent search" to locate the copyright holder and, "throughout the
course of the infringement, provided attribution to the author and copyright owner of the
work, if possible and as appropriate under the circumstances," the remedies for the in-
fringement should be limited to reasonable compensation for use of the work and/or in-
junctive relief. UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS 127
(2006).
140. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34; see also Jonathan Band & Matt Schruers, Dastar, Attribu-
tion, and Plagiarism, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 22-23 (2005) (concluding that the Dastar Court was




Juliet that have followed, all of which could not have been created had
Shakespeare's work not been in the public domain. And were we creat-
ing an intellectual property regime from whole cloth, we might want to
affirmatively create a commons where users could be confident that ma-
terial drawn from that sphere could be used wholly without restriction
from any source, "as free as the air to common use."' 141 But it's not at all
clear that this is the intellectual property regime we now have.
Although the term admits of many definitions, 142 when courts and
scholars talk about the "public domain" in copyright law they typically
describe it as consisting of two elements: speech that can never be subject
to copyright law (such as facts or ideas), 143 and speech that was once
subject to copyright law but for which the copyright term has expired." 44
The latter element is usually situated as part of the "copyright bargain"
inherent in U.S. copyright law: The public is entitled to free use of mate-
rial in the public domain because it granted rights to the creator during
the copyright term. 145 The public domain, so described, constitutes con-
sideration in a contract between the public and the creator, wherein the
public's consideration (in the form of the federal statutory scheme) gives
the creator certain legal rights over her creation that allow her to restrict
141. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing); see also, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Con-
straints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 358-59 (1999).
142. The fuzziness of the term, despite the longevity of the concept, has been a subject
of note to many commentators. See, e.g., David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, 66
LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 463, 463 (2003) (calling the term "elastic and inexact"); Mark
Rose, Nine-Tenths of the Law: The English Copyright Debates and the Rhetoric of the Pub-
lic Domain, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 85 (2003) ("The conclusion that one is forced
to reach, then, is that in the early period in which modern copyright was forming in En-
gland, the legal discourse related to the public domain was feeble when compared to the
strong arguments for authors' property rights."); Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse
on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783 (2006) (considering the multiple definitions of "the
public domain").
143. See, e.g., James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of
the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 33, 39 (2003); cf. Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966) ("Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose
effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access
to materials already available.").
144. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and Culture: Locating the
Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 121, 124-32 (L. Guibault & P.B.
Hugenholtz eds., 2006) (describing the development of the term). Some commentators
would also include material that is currently subject to copyright but is free from copyright
restrictions due to the particular use being made of the work (for example, fair use under
17 U.S.C. § 107). See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 141, at 362.
145. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 214-15 (2003) (describing the bargain as
exchanging the creation of the work for a monopoly lasting for the best available (that is,
constantly updated) term). In Eldred, the Court made an attempt to distinguish copyright
law from patent law, stating that its references to a "quid pro quo typically appear in the
patent context," but the attempt is rather a secondary argument. Id. at 216. Thomas
Nachbar has noted, however, that the construction of U.S. copyright law as a bargain may
not be historically accurate. Thomas B. Nachbar, Constructing Copyright's Mythology, 6
GREEN BAG 37, 44 (2002) (noting that state copyright laws enacted contemporaneously
with the Constitution mention authors' natural rights as much as the benefit to society as
the justification for copyright protection).
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the public's use of the work. 146
How, then, should we describe the creator's consideration-copyright's
public domain? Most courts and commentators appear to conceptualize
the creator's agreement as effecting an affirmative dedication of the ma-
terial to the public.147 The prevailing view of the public domain is that of
a commons, where material is free for anyone to take and use without
restriction. 48 Restrictions on material thought to be in the public do-
main are seen as restrictions on creativity: A creator who has some limita-
tions on the "raw materials" he can use to create is thwarted in the
creative process.' 49 Thus, even fair use rights that are built into the copy-
right statute can be seen as one aspect of the public domain in that they
constitute a deliberately created realm in which copyright owners cannot
assert copyright-based restrictions on use.150
Under this view, the public domain contains, and is built on, an inher-
ent "right to copy"'15 that precludes other forms of regulation (or, at the
146. See, e.g., Eldred, 537 U.S. at 214-15.
147. See, e.g., Lange, supra note 142, at 474 (arguing for consideration of the public
domain as "a status independent and affirmatively recognized in law"); Diane Leenheer
Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have Something to Say? One View of the Public Domain,
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 297, 356 (2004) (contending that the First Amendment generally
requires a "mandatory speech commons").
148. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 141, at 360 ("Information is 'in the public domain' to
the extent that no person has a right to exclude anyone else from using the specified infor-
mation in a particular way. In other words, information is in the public domain if all users
are equally privileged to use it."); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965,
975 (1990) (describing the public domain as "a true commons comprising elements of intel-
lectual property that are ineligible for private ownership" and that "may be mined by any
member of the public"). The increase in communication and creation via the Internet has
undoubtedly reinvigorated interest in a broad description of the public domain. See, e.g.,
Negativland, Two Relationships to a Cultural Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
239, 249 (2003).
149. Gordon, supra note 29, at 1570. But see, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 55, at 620
(noting that some enclosure of information is consistent with the concept of the public
domain); Samuels, supra note 68, at 182 (rejecting the argument that the "public domain"
is a useful concept and contending that copyright law "has within it the limiting doctrines
that protect the public interest"); R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellec-
tual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 997 (2003) (chal-
lenging the claim that "control will reduce the availability of information in the public
domain").
150. See, e.g. James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the
Net, 47 DUKE L.J. 87, 105 (1997) ("[S]ince there is no 'natural' absolute intellectual prop-
erty right, the doctrines which favor consumers and other users, such as fair use, are just as
much a part of the basic right as the entitlement of the author to prevent certain kinds of
copying."). Whereas Boyle appears to characterize fair use as an oppositional right of the
user, Justin Hughes characterizes it as establishing the boundary of the author's right. See
Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: Of Piracy, Propertiziation, and
Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993, 1081 (2006) ("To put this in property parlance,
section 107 fair use draws a border on the property rights granted under section 106. Eve-
rything on the fair use side is not just fair use, it is outside the property right.").
151. Cf. Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 1995) ("The
right to copy is even more robust when the copied product was previously patented but the
patent has expired. In that case, the original producer has reaped his reward of a 17-year
monopoly and the public has already paid the congressionally mandated price for disclo-
sure.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
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very least, other forms of intellectual property regulation).' 52 But it's not
clear why this should be the choice over a conception that defines copy-
right's public domain as simply a state of "not-copyright"-in other
words, an area in which copyright law has no truck, but other areas of the
law, if applicable, can bear on use of the material. 153 Surely the public
domain cannot be a state of pure lawlessness; as Yochai Benkler sug-
gested along similar lines, if an avant-garde New York theatre company
decides to put on a production of Romeo and Juliet using loudspeakers in
the middle of Fifth Avenue at rush hour, it may be subject to laws regulat-
ing the flow of traffic or nuisance, and it cannot use the fact that the work
is the public domain as a defense.154 Or, to take another example, one
cannot pick up a copy of Romeo and Juliet from the local bookstore and
walk out the front door without paying on the basis that the work is in the
public domain and therefore free to the entire public. 155 One final exam-
ple involves United Airlines, which currently uses George Gershwin's
Rhapsody in Blue as the theme music for its television commercials. If
United continues to do so after the song enters the public domain,1 56 it
152. See, e.g., Dinwoodie, supra note 27, at 716 ("More strategically, treating the right
to copy as independent of the functionality doctrine permits advocates of minimalist cate-
gorical protection to set up design trade dress protection as antagonistic to the purposes of
trademark law, rather than reflected within the body of trademark law, and thus posit a
hierarchy of intellectual property regimes.").
153. Language to this effect appears from time to time in judicial discourse, but it is
unclear how deliberately it was intended. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,
247-48 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing copyright's directive as both "creating
incentive for authors to produce" and "removing the related restrictions on dissemination
after expiration of a copyright's 'limited Time'"). In their discussion of "pliability rules" as
applied to copyright, Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky initially appear to adopt
this formulation of the copyright bargain but ultimately describe the public domain more
broadly. Compare Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 39 (2002) (describing copyright as a "zero order pliability rule" in which, upon
expiration of the copyright term, "the initial entitlement owner loses the ability to exercise
property rule protection . . . over her property"), with id. at 42 (describing the
postcopyright term as a time when "anyone can use, reproduce, and market [the works]
freely").
As suggested in the text, I am talking here about copyright's public domain as tradition-
ally identified. Trademark law and patent law each have, of course, their own public do-
mains; the intersection of these three spheres might most cleanly correspond to the view of
the "public domain" as a true commons.
154. Benkler, supra note 141, at 362.
155. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman characterizes this example as the producer's recover-
ing "the costs associated with the packaging of speech goods," the charge being "not for
the content but its embodiment on paper." Zimmerman, supra note 147, at 368. This
characterization, which is, of course, entirely correct, illustrates that forms of propertiza-
tion/monetization not concerned with copyright can coexist with copyright's public
domain.
156. Given the current length of the copyright term, the song will likely not pass into
the public domain until 2018, so this hypothetical is indeed such in that it assumes both that
United Airlines will continue to use the same theme music in its advertising twelve years
hence and that United Airlines will continue to exist twelve years hence. Of course, there
are many other issues associated with United's "recoding" of the song, see Eldred, 537 U.S.
at 249 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that "the $500,000 that United Airlines has had to
pay for the right to play George Gershwin's 1924 classic Rhapsody in Blue represents a
cost of doing business, potentially reflected in the ticket prices of those who fly"); Justin
Hughes, "Recoding" Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L.
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would seem illogical that a new entrant into the airline services market
could create confusion in the marketplace as to the source of its services
by using the song as its advertising theme music and yet successfully de-
fend a suit by United on the ground that the song was now in the public
domain and thus free from any legal restrictions on its use.157 Indeed,
many types of creative endeavors free from copyright might be subject to
other legal restrictions such as trade secret law or the right of publicity
under current doctrine.158 So copyright's public domain doesn't quite
mean free access to formerly copyrighted works; it means, I think, only
that one cannot be sued for copyright infringement for making the kinds
of use of the material that formerly belonged only to the copyright
holder.159 To be sure, this choice between two visions of the public do-
main has considerable implications for the resulting view of unfair com-
petition's (or any other law's) application in the space, as those who take
the former view are likely to see even a slightly more robust application
of trademark law's attribution function as taking from the public some-
thing to which it was entitled. 160 But this is true only if we conceive of
REV. 923, 960 (1999), none of which I mean to discount by this discussion. My discussion
here is intended only to reflect the current allocation of harms among the various intellec-
tual property schemes and not to suggest that the internal structure of each of those
schemes (for example, the current length of the copyright term) is justified.
157. I recognize that this example involves a separate entity-that is, one other than
Gershwin-that has created source-identification meaning in the communicative product.
For that reason, such entities may well have a much stronger trademark-based claim than
would the creator of the communicative product itself. But this should follow from the
application of unfair competition principles of source identification and consumer confu-
sion, not from the categorical exclusion of copyrighted (or formerly copyrighted) material
from trademark law's realm. Perhaps an even clearer example, suggested to me by Robert
Brauneis, is that of a copyrighted corporate logo: It would be bizarre to think that once the
copyright on the logo expires, the company for which it serves as a trademark could no
longer stop competitors from using the logo as a source identifier for their own products or
services.
158. See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 147, at 318 (discussing "the number of times that
the Court historically has approved direct or indirect commodification of speech goods
using a vehicle other than copyright or patent law").
159. In the debate over the Copyright Term Extension Act in 1998, the House's Com-
mittee Report used similar limiting language, albeit to the end of expanding copyright's
hold over creative works:
Upon the expiration of the copyright term, the work falls into the public
domain. This means that anyone may perform the work, display the work,
make copies of the work, distribute copies of the work, and create derivative
works based on the work without first having to get authorization from the
copyright holder. Essentially, the copyright holder no longer has the exclu-
sive ability to exploit the work to their financial gain and no longer 'owns'
the work.
H. REP. No. 105-452, § 5 (1998); see also Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and Meanings of the
Public Domain, 28 DAYTON L. REV. 215, 231 n.116 (2002):
While these statements may sound neutral, they were part of Congress' justi-
fication for enacting term extension and delaying the entry of such works
into the public domain. In other words, allowing works to enter the public
domain was something to be condemned, or at least only grudgingly toler-
ated, rather than something to be celebrated.
Id.
160. See Benkler, supra note 141, at 362-63; Moffat, supra note 27, at 1517-18. But see
Zimmerman, supra note 147, at 371 (noting that although material in the public domain
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copyright's public domain as a limitless grant, free from any legal encum-
brance. This is not the case in the public domain of patent; it is not clear
why it should be any more true in copyright's public domain.
B. TRADEMARK LAW AS CIRCUMVENTION
Another, albeit far more secondary, basis given for why trademark law
should not be viable during the copyright term or during the term of cop-
yright's public domain is the concern that permitting such a cause of ac-
tion would allow content owners to circumvent well-reasoned restrictions
on the scope of trademark law. In Dastar, for example, the Court cited
three cases-Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers,161 in which the
Court held that product design cannot be protected under the Lanham
Act without a showing of secondary meaning; Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thun-
der Craft Boats, Inc.,162 in which the Court rejected Florida's attempt to
create a cause of action for unauthorized copying of unpatented boat hull
molds; and TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc. ,163 in which
the Court held that a maker of road sign stands whose patent had expired
could not assert a Lanham Act claim against a competitor who copied the
functional aspects of the stand design in making its own version of the
stand after the patent expired-as cases whose results would have been
eviscerated if the plaintiff could simply have asserted a reverse passing off
claim of the type asserted in Dastar.164 In the Court's view, each of these
cases imposed a limitation on the reach of the Lanham Act necessary to
maintain trademark law and patent law (in these cases) in separate
spheres.165
But to say that a plaintiff cannot simply rename his harm to avoid sub-
stantive limitations on the assertion of the right is one thing; to extend
that principle to prohibit any other forms of protection is quite another.
In the First Amendment context, for example, the Court's decision in
Hustler v. Falwell tells us that a plaintiff cannot avoid the constitutional
limitations on defamation actions simply by renaming the cause of action
should be free for all to use, trademark law can still provide "reasonable levels of protec-
tion" against consumer confusion). Zimmerman notes further:
[R]ecognition of trademarks as identifiers of the source of goods or services
predates the Constitution, and it would be odd, in my view, to argue that a
constitutional theory of the public domain precludes continued recognition
of them, at least for such limited purposes as identifying the source or
preventing consumer fraud.
Id. at 371 n.309.
161. 529 U.S. 205, 216 (2000).
162. 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).
163. 532 U.S. 23, 35 (2001).
164. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 36-37 (2003). See
also, e.g., Chosun Int'l Inc. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 413 F.3d 324, 328 n.2 (2d Cir. 2005)
(citing Dastar and TrafFix as examples of the "general principle ... that intellectual prop-
erty owners should not be permitted to recategorize one form of intellectual property as
another, thereby extending the duration of protection beyond that which Congress deemed
appropriate for their actual creative efforts").
165. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 36-37.
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as one for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 166 But in such in-
stances, the harm alleged is identical in both causes of action: an injury to
one's reputation caused by an act of speech by the defendant. The
Court's decision requires plaintiffs in these circumstances to use the tort
designed to address the harm alleged, along with its constitutional (or
statutory) limitations.
The same is true in each of the cases the Court cites in Dastar. In
Samara Brothers, the Court merely required the plaintiff to satisfy the
requirements of the Lanham Act (that is, a showing that the article al-
leged to be eligible for trademark protection actually served to identify
source). 167 In Bonito Boats, the Court required statutory schemes de-
signed to address the copying of designs-as opposed to source identifica-
tion-to align with federal patent law. 168 And in TrafFix Devices, the
Court held that a plaintiff could not use evidence of copying-again, the
province of patent law-to prove a trademark law-based claim.169 In
each instance, the Court was, consistent with cases like Hustler, requiring
plaintiffs to bring their claims under the appropriate statutory scheme but
was certainly not barring them altogether. 170
It is curious, then, why the Court seems to have shifted course at the
trademark/copyright interface in Dastar. Consistency with these prior de-
cisions would not require barring the plaintiff's Lanham Act claim alto-
gether in the face of copyright's public domain; rather, it would simply
require confirmation that the plaintiff was seeking to vindicate legally
cognizable trademark law-based interests rather than dressing up a copy-
right-based harm (unauthorized copying) in Lanham Act clothing. (In-
deed, it is probably the case that the fact that Fox was almost certainly
attempting to rescue a failed copyright claim contributed to the breadth
of the Court's decision.) Rather than effecting an end-run around limita-
tions in trademark law brings a Lanham Act suit in the copyright or pub-
lic domain space, a content owner who does so is avoiding an end-run by
correctly characterizing the tort at issue and thereby relinquishing the
current advantage of the broad injunctive relief available for copyright
infringement. 171
166. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988); Peter A. Jaszi,
Goodbye to All That-A Reluctant (and Perhaps Premature) Adieu to a Constitutionally
Grounded Discourse of Public Interest in Copyright Law, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 595,
603-04 (1996) (contending that the public domain has a constitutional dimension).
167. Samara, 529 U.S. at 216.
168. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146.
169. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 35.
170. A similar example involving copyright law is United States v. Martignon, 346 F.
Supp. 2d 413, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), in which the court held that the federal criminal
antibootlegging statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2319A, ostensibly enacted pursuant to Congress's au-
thority under the Commerce Clause, was an impermissible end-run around the Copyright
Clause because "its purpose is synonymous with that of the Copyright Clause." But see
United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th Cir. 1999) (contra); Kiss Catalog,
Ltd. v. Passport Int'l Prods., Inc. 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (contra as to
civil version of statute).
171. The same issue might be said to lie at the heart of the debate over whether content
owners can use extra-copyright or extra-legal measures to achieve control over their crea-
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Thus, it seems both doctrinally appropriate and possibly speech-pro-
moting to restrict copyright owners' claims under copyright law to those
claims at the core economic justification for copyright: the exploitation of
the work qua work. 172 Claims relating to the message conveyed by the
use of the work-that is, claims relating to implications of sponsorship or
endorsement-are better addressed, if at all, by trademark law-based
principles.
IV. AT-TRIBUTIONAL GOALS AND COPYRIGHT MISUSE
A. COPYRIGHT MISUSE
Once a claim is determined to fall outside the scope of copyright,
courts should consider drawing from the doctrine of copyright misuse to
dismiss claims attempting to vindicate trademark-type interests under
copyright law. Originally existing as an equitable doctrine only in patent
law, the doctrine's viability in copyright law has since been well estab-
lished, albeit not in every federal circuit. 173 In both intellectual property
areas, the doctrine derives from the "unclean hands" principle used as an
equitable backstop in many areas of law. The justification is, generally,
tive products. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (use
of contract); Pamela Samuelson, Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Re-
vised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 524 (1999). Here, too, the question should be
(whether characterized as a preemption question or not) whether the goal of the content
owner is to restrict the use of the work in the same way as does copyright law or whether
the content owner is seeking to enforce a different right. In Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus
Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 261-62 (1945), for example, Justice Frankfurter wrote in dissent
that a manufacturer should be bound by a contract purporting to assign an invalid patent,
and thus could be sued for infringement of that patent, because
[t]he essence of the principle of fair dealing which binds the assignor of a
patent in a suit by the assignee, even though it turns out that the patent is
invalid or lacks novelty, is that in this relation the assignor is not part of the
general public but is apart from the general public.
172. Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright Unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives Seriously,
71 U. Ci. L. REV. 75, 81 (2004) ("A focus on harm to the plaintiffs expected plans is...
central to the standard economic justification of copyright."); id. at 88-89 (noting that cop-
yright law currently gives authors "control over how their work is used" through the availa-
bility of injunctions, "which is problematic because injunctions are precisely what cause the
most extreme free speech difficulties").
173. The doctrine has been recognized by courts in almost every circuit (some ex-
pressly, some more hypothetically). See, e.g., Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs.,
Inc., 391 F.3d 1178, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home
Entm't, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 204-06 (3d Cir. 2003); Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v.
WIREdata, Inc. 350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2003); Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc.,
166 F.3d 772, 793 (5th Cir. 1999); Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d
516, 520 (9th Cir. 1997); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973-77 (4th Cir.
1990); United Tel. Co. of Mo. v. Johnson Publ'g Co., 855 F.2d 604, 610-12 (8th Cir. 1988);
Shady Records, Inc. v. Source Enters., Inc., No. 03 CIV 9944 (GEL), 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26143, at *50 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2005); Ass'n of Am. Med. Colls. v. Princeton Re-
view, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 2d 11, 17-20 (D.D.C. 2004); In re Ind. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig.,
114 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 113-14 (D. Kans. 2000). The First, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits
remain more equivocal. See Garcia-Goyco v. Law Envtl. Consultants, Inc., 428 F.3d 14, 21
n.7 (1st Cir. 2005); Telecom Tech. Servs. Inc. v. Rolm Co., 388 F.3d 820, 831 (11th Cir.




that a plaintiff who has taken the benefit of the public grant provided by
copyright and/or patent law should exercise that power only in a responsi-
ble manner; concomitantly, he should not be allowed to enforce the lim-
ited monopoly in court when, as against the defendant in the case or as
against other entities, he has overreached in exercising those rights. 174
The misuse doctrine in copyright law largely parallels its progenitor in
patent law. The case typically identified as the landmark patent misuse
doctrine is Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.,175 in which the Court
held that the holder of a patent on a salt-depositing machine could not
assert its patent against an alleged infringer where the patent holder had
required licensees to use its machine only in conjunction with the patent
holder's (unpatented) salt tablets.' 76 Equitable considerations should bar
the patent infringement suit, the Court held, because the patent monop-
oly is granted as a "special privilege" that includes as an unstated term
the obligation to assert that privilege only in a manner consistent with
public policy-specifically, the exclusion from the patent grant of any-
thing not included with the patented invention. 177 Thus, a patentee that
is using its monopoly in the patented article to acquire a monopoly in an
unpatented article should be forbidden from enforcing its patent at all
until the misuse ends, even against a defendant that is not competing in
the unpatented good. 178
Courts that have adopted the misuse doctrine in copyright infringe-
ment suits take much the same attitude as the Court in Morton Salt: A
copyright holder that attempts, through the licensing of the copyrighted
article, to obtain monopoly-like power over items outside the scope of
the copyright should be barred from enforcing the copyright at all until
the misuse ceases. Thus, as in the patent misuse cases, the equitable de-
fense of copyright misuse allows defendants to eliminate consideration of
the infringement claim (and, relatedly, any considerations of whether the
statutory fair use defense applies) by focusing on the copyright holder's
inequitable conduct rather than on the particulars of the defendant's use
of the content at issue. And, as with its patent law counterpart, the typi-
174. Greater attention has been paid by scholars to copyright misuse in recent years.
See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REv. 1095, 1103 (2003);
Brett Frischmann & Daniel Moylan, The Evolving Doctrine of Copyright Misuse, in 1 IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 269 (Peter Yu, ed. 2007); Lydia Pal-
las Loren, Slaying the Leather-Winged Demons in the Night: Reforming Copyright Owner
Contracting with Clickwrap Misuse, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 495, 514 (2004).
175. 314 U.S. 488, 488 (1942).
176. Id. at 492.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 493 ("Maintenance and enlargement of the attempted monopoly of the un-
patented article are dependent to some extent upon persuading the public of the validity of
the patent, which the infringement suit is intended to establish."); see also Dawson Chem.
Co. v. Rohm & Hass Co. 448 U.S. 176, 193 (1980) (noting that the Morton Salt Court
"explicitly linked the doctrine of patent misuse to the 'unclean hands' doctrine traditionally
applied by courts of equity"). A patentee may acquire a monopoly over an unpatented
article sold by another entity where the unpatented article has no commercial noninfring-
ing use and therefore its sale constitutes contributory infringement. See 37 U.S.C.A.
§ 271(c) (West 2006); Dawson Chem., 448 U.S. at 193.
2007]
SMU LAW REVIEW
cal copyright misuse case involves a content owner's use of licensing re-
strictions to achieve either a longer term of protection than available
under statute or a limitation on permissible uses by the licensee that con-
flict with what would otherwise be available to the licensee pursuant to
statute (for example, an agreement not to engage in certain fair uses or to
develop the idea underlying the copyright). 179 Finally, again as in the
patent cases, a finding of misuse is not the death knell for a copyright
plaintiff; it simply bars the plaintiff from seeking relief until the misuse is
ameliorated. 180
While the doctrine has often been used at the copyright/antitrust inter-
face or to deter similarly uncompetitive activity, courts have not found
that it need be so restricted, 181 and commentators have proposed various
other applications for the doctrine in the copyright context, including at
the copyright/patent interface 182 and within the field of anticircumvention
rights (or "paracopyright").183 In particular, courts and commentators
have noted that an appropriate application of the doctrine is with respect
to assertions of copyright infringement that extend beyond the nature of
the grant to the copyright holder or, more broadly, that conflict with the
policy underlying the Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution. 84
These policies, properly described, should include not only the built-in
constitutional limitation of the idea/expression dichotomy and the statu-
tory fair use provisions, but also rights at the very nature of the copyright
grant that divide the realm of copyright law from the realm of trademark
law.1 85 Indeed, using the doctrine of copyright misuse to police the trade-
179. Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the
"Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 124 (1997).
180. Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 34, at 867.
181. Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 205 (3d Cir.
2003); Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc. 350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2003);
Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990).
182. See Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 34, at 920-21 (regarding software).
183. See Burk, supra note 174, at 1132-40 (regarding anticircumvention or
"paracopyright" rights). Other proposals include using the copyright misuse doctrine to
force disclosure of copyrighted works, see Ralph D. Clifford, Simultaneous Copyright and
Trade Secret Claims: Can the Copyright Misuse Defense Prevent Constitutional Double-
think?, 104 DICK. L. REV. 247, 287 (2000), or to encourage copyright owners to change
their contracting behavior to avoid overreaching provisions more generally, see Loren,
supra note 174, at 514.
184. See, e.g., Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 205-06 (asserting that the doctrine is poten-
tially appropriate where the copyright holder uses an infringement suit "to restrict expres-
sion that is critical of it") (dicta); Assessment Techs. of W, LLC, 350 F.3d at 647
(contending that the doctrine is appropriate where a plaintiff uses a copyright infringement
suit to obtain property protection (for example, in data) "that copyright law clearly does
not confer"); Clifford, supra note 183, at 258; Kathryn Judge, Note, Rethinking Copyright
Misuse, 57 STAN. L. REV. 901, 904 (2004); Loren, supra note 174, at 514; David Scher,
Note, The Viability of the Copyright Misuse Defense, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 89, 101 (1993);
Note, Clarifying the Copyright Misuse Defense: The Role of Antitrust Standards and First
Amendment Values, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1304-07 (1991).
185. I recognize that this is not an uncontroversial proposal. See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval,
Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1128 (1990) ("Like a proprietor of
land or an owner of contract rights, the copyright owner may sue to protect what he owns,




mark/copyright divide mirrors the application of the doctrine at other in-
tellectual property interfaces. As Brett Frischmann and Daniel Moylan
have noted, courts have used the doctrine to serve a "coordination func-
tion" that mediates between related bodies of intellectual prop-
erty-related law;186 more particularly, Dan Burk has suggested that the
misuse doctrine has historically been important to "curtail the forays of
rights holders beyond the uses intended for those rights." 187
Elements of this particular application of the copyright misuse doctrine
can be seen lurking in existing case law, although not at the forefront.
For example, in Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc.,188 a
1966 case in the Second Circuit, Chief Judge Lumbard contended in a
concurrence joined by a majority of the panel that the famous aviator and
businessman Howard Hughes should not have been allowed to use a re-
cently acquired copyright in a series of magazine articles about him to
thwart publication of a forthcoming biography allegedly based on those
articles. Hughes was not using his copyright in the articles to attempt to
engage in selective or abusive licensing, nor was he attempting to enjoin a
competing distribution of the articles; rather, he was quite clearly using
the copyright to restrain publication of the biography altogether. Ac-
cordingly, Judge Lumbard concluded, Hughes was asserting what may
well have been a valid copyright but was doing so to vindicate rights
outside those of the copyright grant:
It has never been the purpose of the copyright laws to restrict the
dissemination of information about persons in the public eye even
though those concerned may not welcome the resulting publicity....
[T]he courts should not tolerate any attempted interference with the
public's right to be informed regarding matters of general interest
when anyone seeks to use the copyright statute which was designed
to protect interests of quite a different nature .... Here, Rosemont
Enterprises acquired the Look copyright and sued upon it six days
later asking injunctive relief, not with a desire to protect the value of
the original writing but to suppress the Random House biography
186. See, e.g., Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 174, at 274 (noting that courts have
used the copyright misuse doctrine "to reinforce subject matter limitations and channeling
doctrines that maintain boundaries"); Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 34, at 875. Relat-
edly, Dan Burk articulates an additional function for misuse: "preserving the courts from
the reputational damage of enforcing legal claims that might be technically legitimate but
which would lead to socially perverse outcomes." Burk, supra note 174, at 1133.
187. Burk, supra note 174, at 1133 ("The consistent theme of misuse cases is refusal to
reward private extension of intellectual property rights contrary to public policy; not sim-
ply to ward off antitrust violations, or even to prevent economically anticompetitive activ-
ity."); see also William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
Wake of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639, 1658 (2004) (terming the copyright misuse doctrine
acceptable "where litigation is threatened in an effort to extract a licensing fee or other
profit when there is no reasonable basis for supposing that the threatener's copyright has
been infringed"); cf. Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, 292 F.3d 512, 520 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that
the court "need not consider" whether a license term controlling speech of licensee consti-
tutes copyright misuse); Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1026, 1047 (2006)
(contending that fraudulent use of copyright occurs when copyright owners attempt to pro-
hibit fair use).
188. 366 F.2d 303, 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
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because Hughes wished to prevent its publication. 89
Similarly, I am proposing here that greater attention be paid when con-
tent owners seek to employ copyright law to protect interests "of quite a
different nature" from the profit-motivated rights in the work it was de-
signed to protect, as well as an alignment of copyright infringement ac-
tions with those economic interests, leaving other interests in
communicative goods to other statutory schemes. 190
The proposal here envisions a slightly different role for the misuse doc-
trine from the one it has played in the past. 19 ' Traditionally, even when it
is used to curb activity apart from pure anticompetitive actions, the doc-
trine appears in cases in which the plaintiff is using the vehicle of licens-
ing for its copyrighted goods (for which it enjoys a monopoly during the
copyright term) to exact from the licensee other commitments to which
copyright law does not apply and, indeed, perhaps even affirmatively dis-
owns (the free use of factual data, for example). 192 Here, however, I am
proposing that a finding of copyright misuse derive not from the content
owner's attempt to control extra-copyright material through the use of a
license for copyrighted material, but rather from the content owner's at-
tempt to control rights outside the scope of those granted under copyright
through the use of a copyright infringement suit.193 To be clear, then, a
finding of misuse in this context is not an attempt to punish the content
owner for exercising its right to protect its copyright by deeming such
exercise anticompetitive; 194 indeed, the content owner in this scenario re-
tains all rights to bring such a suit, so long as it does so to vindicate copy-
right-based interests and not trademark-based ones.
189. Id. at 311, 313 (Lumbard, C.J., concurring).
190. Cf, e.g., Leval, supra note 185, at 1134 ("[Injury to reputation or invasion of pri-
vacy from unauthorized publication] are not the types of harms against which the copyright
law protects; despite irreparability, they should not justify an injunction based on copyright
infringement. Only injuries to the interest in authorship are the copyright's legitimate
concern.").
191. See Burk, supra note 174, at 1133.
192. But not always. See, e.g., Vogue Ring Creations, Inc. v. Hardman, 410 F. Supp.
609, 617 (D.R.I. 1976) (noting, in dicta, that had the plaintiff's copyright been otherwise
valid, the court would have declined to enforce it due to the plaintiff's conduct, including
publishing a misleading "copyright warning").
193. For similar suggestions, see, for example, JuNelle Harris, Beyond Fair Use: Ex-
panding Copyright Misuse to Protect Digital Free Speech, 13 TEX. INTELL. PRop. L.J. 83,
114 (2004) (proposing a doctrine of "public policy copyright misuse" based in part on an
argument that "copyright should not be used to vindicate economic interests unrelated to
the marketability of the protected work itself"); Justin Hughes, supra note 150, at 1082
("We need more courts to adopt the reasoning of Online Policy Group v. Diebold [337 F.
Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004)]: sometimes a copyright claim... is so obviously outside
the borders of the copyright owner's rights, the action constitutes an abuse of process.").
The court in Diebold held that the corporate plaintiff had no copyright interest in internal
e-mails posted to a publicly available website because it did not intend to exploit the e-
mails in the marketplace. Diebold, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1203.
194. Thus, this is not the type of situation that is prohibited under patent law by statute,
see 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(d)(3) (West 2006), or generally by Noerr immunity, see Prof'l Real
Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 56 (1993). Cf. Aaron
Xavier Fellmeth, Copyright Misuse and the Limits of the Intellectual Property Monopoly, 6
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 29 (1998).
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It would, of course, be possible to approximate the goal of this propo-
sal not by turning to trademark law-type concepts but instead by re-
forming copyright law. In fact, other commentators have suggested such
proposals, focusing on the fair use provision. 195 I believe, however, that
using the existing Lanham Act is preferable for two reasons. First, as a
practical matter, application of the copyright misuse doctrine can be ac-
complished judicially within the existing statutory framework, providing
both the necessary flexibility and a more immediate solution. (It is prob-
ably safe to say that in the current legislative climate, reforms to the fair
use provision will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.) Second, an
amendment to the fair use provision will not likely provide the reassur-
ance that subsequent creators need because its application depends on a
preliminary finding of infringement; whether the defendant will enjoy a
safe harbor then depends on the whim of the court.196 By contrast, the
copyright misuse doctrine engages in this inquiry by focusing on the
plaintiff's conduct; 197 moreover, under this proposal, it does not foreclose
a remedy entirely but rather requires the content owner to seek relief
under a more appropriate legal regime.
B. LOCATING THE ArRIBUTIONAL INTEREST
As I have discussed, copyright law, traditionally explained, is aimed at
providing the creator an incentive to create by reserving to her for a lim-
ited time the right to exploit the work itself-to control the number of
copies, the way in which the work is distributed, and whether or not the
work is displayed or performed. But for many creators, particularly indi-
vidual creators, the profit motivation is not paramount. Rather, the crea-
tor is motivated most by the public knowledge that she is the creator-by
attribution of the work to her. Indeed, as others have noted, such cre-
ators value wide dissemination of their work over compensation, and so
benefit from the fair use doctrine and, even, the movement of their work
to the public domain, both of which ensure that their work reaches as
large an audience as possible.' 98 Although this contention can probably
195. See, e.g., Lastowka, supra note 21, at 41-46 (proposing that the fair use factors of
17 U.S.C.A. § 107 be amended to include consideration of whether the alleged infringer
has provided attribution to the author of the work); Kozinski & Newman, supra note 11, at
525-26 (proposing an elimination of § 107's fair use provisions for derivative works and
generally limiting relief to actual damages plus profits attributable to the infringement,
except damages attributable to criticism of the copyrighted work).
196. Bradford, supra note 11, at 747 ("In copyright secondary use cases, courts presume
harm to the work through unauthorized use. They place the burden on the user to prove
the value of the secondary use through affirmative defenses such as parody."); but see id. at
749 (noting the difficulty of separating out copyright claims based on consumer perception
given the current broad derivative works right).
197. Note, supra note 184, at 1306 ("Unlike misuse doctrine, however, the fair use in-
quiry directs courts' attention to the social value of the defendant's conduct rather than the
social harm caused by the plaintiff's use of its copyright").
198. See, e.g., Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532,
1581 (1989); Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It's Due: The Law and Norms of Attribution
95 GEO. L.J. 49, 50 (2006) ("Credit matters in an information economy because it is diffi-
cult to measure worker knowledge directly in the way that the ability of typists and ma-
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be supported only anecdotally and not empirically, it seems safe to con-
clude that the two things that virtually all creators desire is to receive
credit when appropriate and to eliminate the suggestion of association
when it is not. 199
While some commentators have located the attributional and/or associ-
ational interests in communicative goods in the personality of the author,
it seems that these interests also have an important relationship to con-
sumer reaction. 200 We might say, then, that if the law is to give greater
protection than it does to such interests, it should do so when attribution
or association matter to consumers, much as trademark law does with
respect to noncommunicative goods. Consumers of communicative
goods, as I described earlier, have an interest in sorting mechanisms for
those goods that are free from intentional disruption to the extent possi-
ble, and creators of communicative goods have an interest in minimizing
chinists of the industrial economy could be tested simply by watching them perform a
task."). Of course, the conclusion that many creators are not motivated by economic in-
centive, particularly in the academic context, is a bit solipsistic, and others have sounded a
cautionary note in this regard. See, e.g., Wiley, supra note 32, at 149:
The case of the driven genius immune to financial incentives seems too spec-
ulative to treat it as the norm for creation of works of authorship. A safe
stance is to assume that creators are generally interested in cash and respond
to its lure, perhaps leaving the door open for a contrary showing in the unu-
sual case.
Id.
199. One datapoint in this regard comes from Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder,
who have described how almost all authors releasing works pursuant to the Creative Com-
mons license-including those who place little or no copyright-based restrictions on distri-
bution of their work-continue to require attribution as a condition of use. Anupam
Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1331,
1361 (2004). The Copyright Office took note of this statistic in proposing that the limited
remedies for infringement of orphan works depend, in part, on the infringer's having at-
tributed the infringed work. See http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf,
at 110-11. For a discussion of the evolution of Creative Commons, in particular its move
to making attribution a default element of every license, see Lastowka, supra note 21, at
35-38.
200. I have discussed the trademark-like aspects of authorship in Heymann, supra note
44. Many commentators, however, justify attributional rights in terms of their intrinsic
and/or spiritual value to the creator rather than for their benefits to the consumer. See, e.g.,
Kwall, supra note 32, at 1973 (asserting that attribution rights are protected under a moral
rights regime "as integral components of a work's meaning and message as conceived by
the original author as a result of her endowed creative gift"); see also Benkler, supra note
55, at 193 (noting that a Hegelian view of intellectual property sees attribution as having to
do with "the sense that the value of the thing as an expression of self is in its being an
expression of a particular self-its author-and not a fungible expression of human crea-
tivity as a general category"). Not all attribution proposals are derived from intellectual
property rights, however. See, e.g., Fisk, supra note 198, at 53 (proposing that a right of
attribution be regarded as an implied term of every employment contract).
A consideration of whether these proposals can or should exist simultaneously with the
one suggested here is beyond the scope of the Article. While I believe that the attribu-
tional/associational interests in communicative goods map fairly well onto existing unfair
competition doctrine, and so are worth considering within that framework, I do not mean
to suggest here that, for this reason, consideration of additional regimes is illegitimate. In
short, I am suggesting in this Article that unfair competition law is a preferable framework
for dealing with attributionallassociational interests over our current copyright law; I take
no position here as to whether it is a preferable framework over our current copyright law
with an additional moral rights component.
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this disruption. Thus, although creators may have a personal interest in
correct attributional signals, that interest has a strong (and existing) legal
resonance when considered as a means to the end of diminishing con-
sumer confusion. Courts (at least pre-Dastar) justified locating attribu-
tional rights in the Lanham Act on this basis.20'
This is not to say, however, that a creator obtains a legally cognizable
attributional right the moment a work is created. In order to make possi-
ble the claim that the defendant is causing confusion as to the "sponsor-
ship or approval"202 of his goods or services by the plaintiff, the plaintiff's
work (as used in the defendant's work) must be recognizable as that of
the plaintiff. It may well be true-and this is a positive attribute-that
few creators will be able to state such a case. Thus, while it is possible
that, at the threshold, Lionel Richie's estate has a legally cognizable claim
that "Endless Love" satisfies this requirement (although it may ultimately
fail to satisfy the requirement that viewers of the Bush/Blair video will
believe that Richie sponsored or approved the video), Art Rogers's case
is significantly weaker. 20 3 The move to trademark law-based principles is
thus both doctrinally more coherent and, I believe, ultimately speech-
enhancing.
Thus, locating attribution as an economic interest of consumers rather
than an economic right of authors-the divide between trademark-type
interests and copyright interests-ultimately benefits subsequent cre-
ators. As discussed earlier, a copyright infringer will often (although not
always) be enjoined from making use of the work at all, assuming that he
is not fortunate enough to be graced with a favorable finding from the
court as to fair use.20 4 But utilizing trademark law as a model yields the
possibility of a remedy better tailored to the harm: an injunction that al-
201. See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. Majestic Pictures Corp., 70 F.2d 310, 311-12 (2d Cir.
1934) (movie title); Simon & Schuster, Inc v. Dove Audio, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 279, 291
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (book title); cf. Rigamonti, supra note 15, at 360 (noting that "moral rights
law is considered an integral part of copyright law" because "moral rights are rights in
copyrightable works similar in structure to economic rights").
202. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (West 2006).
203. Cf. Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 60 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting in dicta that
the district court correctly dismissed singer's false implied endorsement claim based on use
of a song in a commercial on the ground that no reasonable jury could have found an
implied endorsement); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1107 (9th Cir. 1992) (af-
firming judgment for a singer on a false implied endorsement claim for use of imitation of a
distinctive voice in a commercial). The kinds of cases I am addressing in this Article, which
seem to have false endorsement, if anything, at their core (and not misappropriation theo-
ries), are thus not appropriate candidates for a right of publicity claim. See ROGER E.
SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS,
PATENTS, AND TRADEMARKS 266 (2003) (describing the difference).
204. See, e.g., ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT 909-12 (7th ed.
2006) (discussing the circumstances under which injunctions are issued pursuant to 17
U.S.C.A. § 502); see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1840 (2006)
(noting that equitable considerations apply); N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 505
(2001) (noting that injunctions need not always issue in copyright infringement cases). See
generally James L. Oakes, Copyrights and Copyremedies: Unfair Use and Injunctions, 18
HOFSTRA L. REV. 983, 983 (1990); James Thompson, Note, Permanent Injunctions in Copy-
right Infringement: Moral and Economic Justifications for Balancing Individual Rights In-
stead of Following Harsh Rules, 7 S. CAL. INTERDIsC. L.J. 477, 477 (1998).
2007]
SMU LAW REVIEW
lows the defendant's continued use of the work at issue but requires her
to address likely consumer confusion as to sponsorship or authorization
of the later work by the author of the former work.20
5
Taking these points together, then, leads to my proposal: The trade-
mark/copyright interface should be treated no differently from other in-
tellectual property interfaces, such that claims asserting harm relating to
the interest in exploiting the work itself should be addressed by copyright
law, while claims asserting harm relating to the way the source of the
work is presented to consumers should be addressed by trademark
law-based schemes. Neither claim is duplicative of the other, and both
claims operate independently, such that the availability of a claim under
copyright law (that is, whether the work is under copyright or not, or
whether the defendant's incorporation of the work qualifies as fair use)
has no bearing on whether a claim is cognizable under trademark law
principles.
205. The injunction may therefore require the provision of a disclaimer or, perhaps, an
acknowledgment. I recognize, however, that the effectiveness of disclaimers is still a mat-
ter of debate. See, e.g., King v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824, 824 (2d Cir. 1992) ("based
on" disclaimer); Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 832 F.2d 1325, 1330 (2d Cir.
1987) ("[W]here, as here, the likelihood of consumer confusion is far less than substantial,
we believe that it is within the district court's discretion to grant disclaimer relief."); Am.
Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1144 (3d Cir. 1986):
[W]here it is not feasible in practice to avoid the potential for confusion
through the selection of alternative non-functional elements or the manner in
which one combines imitated functional ones, the most that can be required
is clear labeling disclosing source or other reasonable steps to minimize the
risk of confusion.
Id.; Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1053
(2d Cir. 1983):
Disclaimers are a favored way of alleviating consumer confusion as to source
or sponsorship. Absolute prohibitions of speech . . . are improper where
there is any possibility that an explanation or disclaimer will suffice .... The
First Amendment demands use of a disclaimer where there is a reasonable
possibility that it will suffice to alleviate consumer confusion.
Id.; Warner Bros. v. Majestic Pictures Corp., 70 F.2d 310, 312-13 (2d Cir. 1934) (enjoining
distribution of film without a disclaimer disassociating plaintiff); Matrix Essential, Inc. v.
Emporium Drug Mart, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 280, 282 (D. La. 1991) ("not affiliated" dis-
claimer); Hosp. for Sick Children v. Melody Fare Dinner Theatre, 516 F. Supp. 67, 73 (E.D.
Va. 1980) ("based on" or "derived from" disclaimer); Bone, supra note 48, at 2182-83
(proposing use of disclaimers in merchandising cases); Denicola, supra note 88, at 613-14
(discussing qualified injunctions); Dinwoodie, supra note 27, at 728 (supporting "limited
Iregulatory' relief (such as confusion-minimizing labeling of defendant's similar products or
corrective advertising by the defendant) being accorded the owner of a distinctive trade
dress that is found to be functional"); Kwall, supra note 32, at 2003-12 (proposing attribu-
tion as part of a moral rights regime); David Lange & Jennifer Lange Anderson, Copyright,
Fair Use and Transformative Critical Appropriation (2001), http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/pa-
pers/langeand.pdf (suggesting that a requirement of acknowledgment "should play an ordi-
nary role in cases of transformative critical appropriation"); cf. e.g., Jacob Jacoby & Robert
Lloyd Raskopf, Disclaimers in Trademark Infringement Litigation: More Trouble Than
They Are Worth?, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 35, 40 (1986) (contending that disclaimers are
generally ineffective); Mitchell E. Radin, Disclaimers as a Remedy for Trademark Infringe-
ment: Inadequacies and Alternatives, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 59, 61 (1986) (same). Professor
Radin suggests, moreover, that a disclaimer might work more harm to the plaintiff by link-
ing her name and the defendant's name in the consumer's mind. Radin, supra, at 64.
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Having reached this equilibrium, intellectual property law should
therefore no longer countenance a content owner's use of copyright law
to assert trademark law-based interests. Indeed, where a content owner
attempts to take advantage of the broad remedies available under copy-
right law to restrain uses of his material that do not relate to exploitation
of the work but instead suggest an affiliation or association with the con-
tent owner, courts should consider that attempt an instance of copyright
misuse.
V. CONCLUSION
Intellectual property scholars who are somewhat hesitant to recognize
more robust attribution rights via trademark law are, I think, con-
cerned-and correctly so-that such recognition will change the current
landscape of copyright's public domain. If Disney is permitted to exer-
cise trademark rights over Mickey Mouse after its copyright in the char-
acter expires, then the public will be deprived of some uses of that
material, uses to which it thought it was entitled.206 But the harm should
be fairly minimal if courts are vigilant: Disney can exercise these trade-
mark rights only if it can demonstrate a likelihood of confusion through
the defendant's use. Parodies, satires, and the like are presumably not
candidates for a successful suit, since such uses almost certainly depend
on the consumer's recognition that the original author is not the
source; 20 7 fan fiction and similar endeavors may also fall into the same
category, depending on how the market understands such pursuits. But if
the appearance of a Mickey Mouse statue at the front of a non-Disney
theme park after the copyright has expired nevertheless suggests to pa-
trons that Disney has some affiliation with or sponsorship of the theme
park, it does not seem to be beyond the bounds of rationality to permit
206. See Moffat, supra note 27, at 1507-08.
207. See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th
Cir. 1997) ("In a traditional trademark infringement suit founded on the likelihood of con-
fusion rationale, the claim of parody is ... merely a way of phrasing the traditional re-
sponse that customers are not likely to be confused as to the source, sponsorship or
approval."); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 321 (4th Cir. 1992)
("Although parody necessarily evokes the original trademark, effective parody also dimin-
ishes any risk of consumer confusion."); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell
Publ'g Group, 886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989):
A parody must convey two simultaneous-and contradictory-messages:
that it is the original, but also that it is not the original and is instead a par-
ody. To the extent that it does only the former but not the latter, it is not only
a poor parody but also vulnerable under trademark law, since the customer
will be confused.
Id. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE LI-TLE BOOK OF PLAGIARISM 17-18 (2007) ("Often copying
is not acknowledged because it is known to the intended readership .... Allusion is not
plagiarism because the reader is expected to recognize the allusion."). While courts have
tended to treat satires differently from parodies in copyright law cases by concluding that a
licensing market exists for the former but not for the latter, see, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P.,




Disney to take action.208
To be clear, the proposal in this Article is not a limitation on the right
to copy as such. To the extent one views copyright's public domain as
permitting copying without regard to consumer confusion, this Article's
proposal works a more significant incursion.20 9 But, properly viewed, the
proposal does not permit injunctions against copying, as copyright law
would, and thus reduces the tension that occurs if plaintiffs were permit-
ted to use trademark law to prevent copying altogether. 210 Indeed, per-
haps one barrier to adoption of this proposal is the now well-accepted
inclusion of trademarks within what we call intellectual "property," a
term that suggests the ability to restrict use altogether through injunctive
relief.2 11 Copyright law, in its provisions that allow content holders to
control the use of the property qua property and define its metes and
bounds, tends to resemble real property more than trademark law, which
provides a rights-holder not with the ability to control the trademark qua
208. Cf. Jessica Litman, Mickey Mouse Emeritus: Character Protection and the Public
Domain, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 429, 432 (1994) ("[I]f I, the consumer, don't
want to see an animated film about Snow White and the Seven Dwarves unless the Disney
Company produced it, then Disney should be able to stop Filmation from deceiving me
about who made the film, 'Snow White: The Adventure Continues'...."); id. at 432-33
(expressing concern that trademark law has not been so limited to such instances with
respect to protection of characters); Catherine Seville, Peter Pan's Rights: "To Die Will Be
an Awfully Big Adventure," 51 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 1, 26 (2003) ("Although the de
facto extension of copyright beyond its statutory term is an obvious concern in [passing off]
cases, it is probably defensible.").
209. See Margreth Barrett, Trade Dress Protection for Product Configurations and the
Federal Right to Copy, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ETrr. L.J. 471, 476 (1998) ("[P]ermitting
plaintiffs to rely on § 43(a) to prevent the copying of product features creates a distinct
tension with Congress' plan in enacting the patent and copyright laws.").
210. Cf. Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co. (Mf'g), 50 F.3d 189,207 (3d Cir. 1995) ("It is not
unfair competition for someone to trade off the good will of a product; it is only unfair to
deceive consumers as to the origin of one's goods and thereby trade off the good will of a
prior producer.") (citation omitted); Davis, supra note 68, at 652 (noting that the Intellec-
tual Property Clause of the Constitution would not preclude liability "if a defendant's cop-
ying of entirely functional features is coupled with separate and independent acts of unfair
competition such as 'palming off,' false advertising, or deceptive trade practices. On the
contrary, relief under these circumstances is not only permissible, but appropriate.");
Daniel M. McClure, Trademark and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal
Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 307 (1979) ("Competitors are free to produce identical
or similar products, and it would seem that preventing competitors from using each other's
trademarks amounts to only a slight impediment to free competition."); David S.
Welkowitz, Trade Dress and Patent-The Dilemma of Confusion, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 289, 306
(1998-1999) (noting that patent law "gives exclusionary rights to the owner," while trade-
mark law "seeks to make sure that the competitive market operates properly"); cf. Lange,
supra note 30, at 177 n.137 (noting a difference between moral rights that ensure recogni-
tion and moral rights that protect the "integrity" of the work and suggesting that the latter
may conflict with rights in the public domain). In proposing that a right of attribution be
considered to be an implied term in every employment contract, Catherine L. Fisk suggests
that the remedy for failure to attribute would therefore "not be an injunction against distri-
bution of the work without attribution" but rather "a right to share the reputation benefits
of the authorship." Fisk, supra note 198, at 114.
211. David Lange has suggested something similar, although he seems to retreat from
this suggestion a paragraph later. See Lange, supra note 142, at 470 (characterizing a for-
mer article as embodying a proposal to, inter alia, shift intellectual property law to a liabil-
ity regime and a concomitant move to disclaimers rather than injunctions); id. (noting that
these assertions are "not quite what I would say today").
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trademark but only, at best, with the ability to control certain associations
or relationships between trademark meaning and the mark itself.212
I do not pretend in proffering this suggestion that the law of unfair
competition always maps easily onto communicative products. Consum-
ers may not always think of content creators as "sources" in the tradi-
tional, trademark-like sense, and even where this understanding exists, it
may be difficult to establish the same "brand equals source" dynamic as
exists in the usual goods/services context such that the typical likelihood-
of-confusion analysis can be conducted. As commentators have noted,
consumers' understanding of whether the use of a name or other element
on a communicative good reflects a suggestion of sponsorship or other
approval may depend on something of a feedback loop: consumers will
have this understanding if the courts tell them this is what they are to
expect, while courts will reach this conclusion if they perceive consumers
to have this understanding.213 In the end, this may mean simply that the
point of equilibrium between confusion and lack thereof may shift in tan-
dem with the law and/or consumer perceptions. I do not think, however,
that the idea that attribution of source in communicative goods will cease
to have relevance for consumers altogether.
Moreover, as I suggested earlier, this is a modest proposal, in which-
as is often the case-the devil lies in the details. Given the variety of uses
that second-generation creators make of others' work, the line at the
trademark/copyright divide is not as sharp as it might be at the other
intellectual property interfaces. In addition, the current uncertainty sur-
rounding the interplay between derivative uses and claimed licensing
markets 214 may enable copyright owners to easily recharacterize claims
and thereby evade the restrictions this Article proposes to implement.
But asking courts to attempt to smoke out pretext is not assigning them
an unfamiliar task, and the fact that the efficacy of the tool I am propos-
ing might ultimately be determined case by case is not a basis, in and of
itself, to reject it altogether.
But allowing trademark law principles to play even this more minor
role in copyright's public domain, and to accord it a dominant role against
the use of copyright in appropriate circumstances, has the potential to
solve both the concerns of content owners and the concerns of subse-
quent creators: It provides a vehicle for the attribution claims most origi-
nal creators appear to desire (although it is a vehicle only few can ride),
and it releases some of copyright's hold over the dissemination and use of
works that subsequent creators claim to need. So to recognize the trade-
212. See, e.g., Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 643 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[T]rademarks
are not monopolies. Others can produce designs similar to the trademark so long as there
is no likelihood of consumer confusion.").
213. See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile
Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 485-89 (2005); Jacob Jacoby, Sense and
Nonsense in Measuring Sponsorship Confusion, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENr. L.J. 63, 85
(2006).
214. See generally Lemley, supra note 21.
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mark/copyright divide is simply to preserve this distinction: to require
content owners to assert attribution claims as such during the term of
copyright, and to permit them to continue to do so afterward. Copyright
law does not forbid this and, I believe, might be enhanced by it.
